GIBSON AND OTHERS AGAINST BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL LIMITED [2018] ScotCS CSOH

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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> GIBSON AND OTHERS AGAINST BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL LIMITED [2018] ScotCS CSOH_78 (25 July 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2018/[2018]_CSOH_78.html Cite as: [2018] ScotCS CSOH_78, [2018] CSOH 78, 2018 SLT 886, 2018 GWD 24-309

“Claims for personal injury arising out of exposure to noise, vibration, or other

health risks, particularly where the exposure was over a long period of time in

different circumstances, notoriously give rise to difficulties. While it may be

dangerous to generalise, the cases demonstrate, and common sense and fairness

require, that unless it is clear that decisive evidence would have been relatively easily

available, and that there was no good reason why it is not before the court, it is

normally wrong for the court simply to shelter behind the burden of proof and

dismiss the claim” Harris v BRB (Residuary) Ltd and Another [2005] ICR 1680,

“It is important that judges should bear in mind that the Fairchild exception itself

represents what the House of Lords considered to be the proper balance between the

interests of claimants and defendants in these cases. Especially having regard to the

harrowing nature of the illness, judges, both at first instance and on appeal, must

resist any temptation to give the claimant’s case an additional boost by taking a lax

approach to the proof of the essential elements. That could only result in the balance

struck by the Fairchild exception being distorted” Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] 2

[1] The pursuers are the children, siblings and grandchildren of the late

Adrienne Sweeney (“the deceased”), who died of mesothelioma on 30 August 2015. The

first pursuer also sues in her capacity as executrix nominate of the deceased. The pursuers

seek to prove that the deceased contracted mesothelioma because she was exposed to

asbestos when it came into her home on the working clothes of her husband, the late

William Sweeney (“Mr Sweeney”). They seek to prove also that the deceased was so

exposed to asbestos because of the negligence of the defenders, who employed Mr Sweeney

between 1962 and 1971. Damages are the subject of agreement in a joint minute between the

[2] The nature, extent and timing of any exposure of Mr Sweeney to asbestos while in

the employment of the defenders is a matter of dispute, as is the date at which employers

such as the defenders ought to have been alert to the risk of harm by way of secondary

[3] There is no direct evidence as to the circumstances of Mr Sweeney’s employment

with the defenders. The relevant period ended 46 years ago. Mr Sweeney himself died in

[4] The pursuers led hearsay evidence from Mr Joseph McCluskey, about statements he

had taken from the deceased and from a Danny Watson. Mr Watson had also died before

the proof. The defenders objected to Mr McCluskey’s evidence on the basis that evidence

was being led as to the content of precognitions. I allowed the evidence to be led subject to

competency and relevancy, as it seemed to me that I required to hear evidence in order to

establish whether or not the statements he was speaking about were properly categorised as

precognitions. In submissions the defenders withdrew their objection and accepted that the

statements spoken to were not precognitions. Their submission was instead that very little

weight could be accorded to the evidence, and that it was of very little value in establishing

the pursuers’ contentions. The pursuers also led evidence from James Brennan, from

Mr Robin Howie, occupational hygienist, and from Dr Semple, retired consultant physician.

[5] Mr Howie was present in court throughout the evidence of Mr McCluskey and

[6] This case provides a working example of the tension between the approaches

described in the dicta already quoted. There is no direct evidence about the nature and

extent of the exposure of either Mr Sweeney or the deceased to asbestos dust. There can be

no criticism of any failure to capture Mr Sweeney’s evidence. He died long before the

deceased developed mesothelioma. Mesothelioma can have a long latent period. As time

passes, it will inevitably become more difficult to obtain evidence from witnesses who

worked in industrial environments, and it may be near to impossible to prove actual levels

of exposure to contaminants in such environments. Those factors no doubt underlie the

approach outlined by Neuberger LJ. On the other hand, defenders are entitled to a fair trial.

If there is a suggestion that a “lax” approach to proof needs to be adopted, will that result in

[7] Mr Mackenzie objected to the late addition of Mr Brennan as a witness, and to the

late lodging of a letter written by Mr Howie. Mr Brennan’s precognition, and Mr Howie’s

report, contained references to the cutting of solid sections of asbestos, which was not

something that featured in the case on record. Mr Brennan’s evidence was not obviously

relevant, as he had not worked with the deceased, and the site was a large one.

Mr Brennan’s name had been mentioned as a possible witness at the pre-trial meeting, but a

motion to have him added had been dropped. Mr Howie’s report contained evidence which

was of poor quality. He had referred to precognitions in full, when those precognitions

were themselves inadmissible. He had apparently relied on information from an English

reported case as providing data relevant to his calculations. The defender’s expert could not

reach any conclusions because of the imprecise nature of the information presented by the

[8] It seemed to me that the complaints were about lack of relevance and poor quality in

the evidence, rather than that the defenders were prejudiced or being deprived of a fair

hearing because of their late admission. The matters raised by Mr Mackenzie were matters

which might potentially weigh in the exercise of my discretion in deciding whether or not to

allow the late addition of a witness or lodging of a document. I considered, however, that if

Mr Mackenzie’s criticisms were correct, they could be ventilated by objection to evidence for

which there was no record, and by testing what was said to be weak evidence in the usual

[9] Mr Di Rollo objected to certain late productions, including plans and other

documents because he could not see their relevance. Again, I allowed the documents to be

lodged without prejudice to any objection that might arise on the basis of lack of record for a

[10] The deceased’s employment history as reflected in 6/24, a document produced by

HMRC, was agreed. That disclosed that she worked for Motorway Tyres and Accessories

(Scotland) Ltd in years 1977/8-1979/80, and for Clanford Motors Ltd in years 1980/81-1994/5

[11] Joseph George McCluskey is 43 years of age and is a paralegal employed by

Thompsons, Solicitors in their Glasgow office. He has worked for Thompsons since 1993,

and for the last thirteen years has been a paralegal. He undertook a paralegal course for

which he received a certificate. He works in the pre-litigation team of the lung disease team.

His work includes taking statements, carrying out company investigations and obtaining

medical records at the start of a claim. He works only on asbestos-related cases, and for the

last three years has worked only on mesothelioma claims. He sees about two or three new

[12] Mr McCluskey spoke to the deceased in person in June 2015. He met her at her home

in Paisley, and the first pursuer, her daughter, was present as well. It took him about an

hour and a half to take the statement. The deceased was emotional, which was

understandable in the context of her diagnosis, but was lucid, and he would not have known

without being told that she was suffering from mesothelioma. The statement was produced

as 6/55. It was signed and dated by the deceased on every page, and she had made certain

corrections to it, which were marked on its face. She had, for example, changed a reference

to Liverpool to one to Birkenhead, and had corrected a reference to a Ewbank carpet

[13] Mr McCluskey described the process by which the statement had come into being.

He took handwritten notes during his meeting with the deceased (produced as 6/39). When

he returned to his office he dictated a statement based on his notes, and then sent it out to

her for signature. Mr McCluskey also spoke in full to his handwritten notes, which would

not have been particularly easy to read without the aid of his oral evidence about them.

[14] In relation to her employment with Motorway Tyres, and Clanford Motors, the

deceased did not know whether the mechanics used asbestos brake linings. At the former

firm, she had to go on the garage floor to check invoices with the mechanics. At the latter

she recalled dust in the body shop and in the loft. She visited the body shop several times a

[15] I quote in full the parts of the deceased’s statement relevant to my task.

“After we married, we lived with my husband’s mother for a period and this was

a high-rise flat at George Court in Paisley before we got our first house in 1963.

After coming up to Paisley my husband worked for a short period for Chrysler

Motors before returning to work with Babcock and Wilcox. He worked with

Babcock and Wilcox from 1961 until 1972 when he was made redundant and

worked with them again from 1974 until 1992 when he was again made

As I have mentioned previously my husband worked as an engineer fitter with

Babcocks and worked in the construction of the boilers. I do not recall ever

having any discussions with my husband about his asbestos exposure but I do

know that he did come home with asbestos dust on his overalls and his

The first house me and my husband had was at 17 Calside in Paisley. We moved

into this house in approximately August 1963. This was a terraced house with a

front and back door and this was upstairs and downstairs and there was a front

room, separate kitchen, separate bathroom and there was also a dining room area

with an area like a wash house attached to this. It was in this wash house that I

would was my husband’s work clothes. I had a twin-tub washing machine there.

I washed my husband’s work clothes by hand throughout the period we lived at

17 Calside. I recall my husband during this period would carry his overalls to

work and he would normally wear a pullover and jeans or old trousers under his

overalls. He wore work boots and I sure [sic] he wore a cop when he was at

My husband was around 5 ft 8 in in [sic] height and I recall he did wear turn-ups

on his trousers and on his overalls and he used to always turn the arms of his

overalls up. When I had to wash his work clothes and his overalls I recall they

were covered in dust and they were always manky. As a result I tended to wash

my husband’s work clothes separate from the rest of the families [sic] clothes

It is hard to estimate how often I washed my husband’s overalls as on occasions

he did have to change them regularly due to the state they would get in. I also

recall the undergarments would also be covered in dust as he would tend to

At the utility room where I did the washing at 17 Calside, this led to the back

door of the house which led out to the garden, so before washing my husband’s

overalls I would normally shake them out at the back door. I would turn the

I then washed them my [sic] had in the twin-tub which had an area for washing

the clothes and then an area for rinsing them. I then ran the clothes through a

mangle and if the weather was good I would hang the clothes out in the garden

but if it was during the winter we had a pulley in the utility room where I would

I do not recall having a basket where I would leave the clothes as there were pegs

in a cloakroom where he would sometimes hang his overalls if he was going to

use them the next day. When my husband came home from work he would

normally greet me with a cuddle while he still had his work clothes on. I recall

he would normally carry his overalls under his arm. He also used to pick the

kids up when he came into the house after coming home from work and give

Depending on what shift he was on he would sometimes sit and have his tea with

his work clothes on or if he was particularly dirty he would go and get changed

A lot of the time he worked night shift and he tended to come in the back door

when he was working night shift and would sit and have something to eat before

The floors at 17 Calside were mainly linoleum but in the living area we had rugs

down. In the utility room where I washed the clothes, this was a linoleum floor.

I used to sweep the floor regularly as I had small kids at the time who would be

crawling about the floors so I tried to keep everything clean. I would have to

For the rugs in the house, I had a small cleaning apparatus like a sweeper that I

called a Ewbank carpetsweeper. I used this to clean the rugs. This involved

manually running the sweeper over the rugs and there was a compartment

where any dust collected and I then had to empty this into the bin.

I recall at some point my husband stopped bringing his overalls home as the

company started cleaning the overalls and providing fresh ones. I could not say

I don’t think this was at any point during the period we were living at 17

[16] At the end of his meeting with the deceased, Mr McCluskey asked if she knew about

former workmates of Mr Sweeney, and she volunteered the name Danny Watson. Either the

deceased or the first pursuer telephoned Mr Watson, and an arrangement was made for

Mr McCluskey to speak to Mr Watson the following day. They spoke by telephone for

about 15 minutes, and Mr McCluskey took notes of the conversation.

[17] The purpose of speaking to Mr Watson was to get his recollections of working with

Mr Sweeney, the types of work they did, and of asbestos being used at the site.

Mr McCluskey spoke with Mr Watson on 10 June 2015. Mr McCluskey was referred to his

handwritten notes of his conversation with Mr Watson (6/40). No typed or signed statement

[18] Mr McCluskey learned that Mr Sweeney and Mr Watson were in the same

department. Both were engineer fitters involved in boilermaking. They worked together at

Renfrew. They served apprenticeships together and then went their own ways and later

came back together when they both had returned to the company. Mr Watson had

described work involving the assembly of boilers. That was the main point where asbestos

came into play. It was in the form of gaskets and rope, and labourers lagged boilers and

blowers with asbestos. The two men had not worked directly together, but in the same

department. The implication was that Mr Sweeney was doing the same things and was

exposed to the same atmosphere. Mr Watson described a very dusty atmosphere from the

processes involving asbestos. He was directly involved with asbestos gaskets and rope, and

worked in the vicinity of labourers lagging boilers with asbestos. Mr McCluskey’s note

boilers and blowers all lagged – used asb gaskets. Put them on, rope asbestos

monkey dung – paste asbestos – labourers on the […] smoothed it all off – then

[19] Mr Sweeney and Mr Watson grew up together, and served time as apprentice

engineers together. Mr Sweeney was in the assembly and tube area. He worked all over the

works, in all sorts of fitting work. Mr McCluskey noted that Mr Watson left Babcock and

Wilcox in 1957 and spent 5 or 6 years in the Merchant Navy. The date 1964, overwriting

“1963” appears in the notes, and seems to be the year that Mr McCluskey noted as that in

which Mr Watson returned to work at Babcock and Wilcox. He said that “later on” masks

were provided, but that he could not be specific as to when. Mr McCluskey asked him

about overalls, and Mr Watson recalled that the workmen did take overalls home to be

“[… ] boiler – gaskets – making up rope sealed the door of the boiler. Lots of asb

[20] Counsel asked Mr McCluskey if it had been clear from what he learned from

Mr Watson that asbestos was being broken up and cut. Mr McCluskey replied that

Mr Watson spoke about dust being released from those processes. Dust had been deposited

[21] Mr Watson spoke about paste asbestos being used for lagging for fire resistance.

Although Mr McCluskey did not at first remember Mr Watson using the term monkey

dung, when he referred to his notes, he found that Mr Watson had used that term.

Mr Watson had referred to a Mr James Hester, a mate of the deceased’s who had died the

previous year. Mr Watson gave two other names, one said to have been a joiner, and the

other said to have died from asbestos related illness. The account given by Mr Watson was

of a nature familiar to Mr McCluskey and was similar to accounts he had heard from a

number of clients over the years. Mr McCluskey had heard similar histories of exposure to

asbestos in the course of employment with the defenders at the Porterfield Road works.

[22] The end date of Mr Watson’s employment with the defenders is not recorded in

Mr McCluskey’s handwritten notes. Mr McCluskey’s evidence was that he understood

Mr Watson to have been in the defenders’ employment at the same time as Mr Sweeney.

[23] In cross examination Mr McCluskey accepted that the typewritten statement of the

deceased was more extensive than his handwritten notes. He explained that the statement

reflected his recollection of his discussion with the deceased the previous day. He accepted

the word “manky” in the statement simply denoted “dirty” and that the deceased had not

given any more specific description of the state of Mr Sweeney’s clothes. The Ewbank

sweeper had been used for cleaning rugs generally, and its use would not have been

[24] He was questioned about his understanding of the deceased’s account of shaking out

Mr Sweeney’s clothes. It was suggested to him that she had described Mr Sweeney

removing his clothes at the back door after coming through the back garden. Mr McCluskey

said that the deceased’s account had been that she shook out the clothes at the time she came

to wash them. He could not say whether the deceased would have met Mr Sweeney at the

back door as he arrived with his overalls under his arm. She had not expanded on when the

deceased would get changed. Sometimes he would sit and have his tea with his work

[25] Mr McCluskey was asked about receiving referrals from Clydeside Action on

Asbestos, and accepted that he did. That was a charity that helped people who had

allegedly been exposed to asbestos, and their relatives. They would help with claiming

statutory benefits. He did not receive referrals from Mesothelioma UK.

[26] The first pursuer had been present throughout Mr McCluskey’s conversation with the

deceased. He could not recall whether he had heard the telephone call made to Mr Watson by

the deceased or the first pursuer. He was aware that the first pursuer had had advice from

Clydeside Action on Asbestos, and had carried out some research that had led her to

Mesothelioma UK, before she spoke to him. She had made it plain that she believed that

Mr Sweeney had been exposed to asbestos while working for the defenders.

[27] So far as Mr McCluskey was aware, Mr Watson had not been a client of Thompsons.

Mr Watson had grown up with Mr Sweeney, and knew the deceased as well. Mr McCluskey

“had no doubt” that Mr Watson wanted to help. There was no note as to any indication given

by Mr Watson as to when overalls were supplied, when masks were supplied, how often

Mr Watson worked with laggers, how close to them he worked, or for how long. There was

no note of where in the premises Mr Watson worked, or of the various duties that might be

carried out by an engineer/fitter. There was no note of Mr Watson’s having seen Mr Sweeney

working near people using monkey dung. There was no detail of what Mr Sweeney did, other

than that he used gaskets for packing boilers. Mr McCluskey had not been involved with

[28] James Brennan is aged 70, and is retired. He worked for the defenders between 1963

and 1968 as an apprentice engineer fitter, at the Porterfield Road works in Paisley. The work

that was done in those works was the manufacture of boilers and parts for boilers. The boilers

were used in power stations and factories and on ships as well. Asbestos was used where he

was. At first Mr Brennan seemed to indicate that he had learned at a later stage, by internet

researches, that the defenders had used asbestos. He was asked whether he could say whether

asbestos was used when he was working for the defenders, and he replied in the affirmative.

He was asked how he knew, and replied that he started to investigate the matter on the

internet and found out that the defenders had been using asbestos and did not stop until the

mid-1970s. He was asked if was aware of it at the time that he was doing the work, and he

replied, that he did not. No-one had told him that asbestos was being used. He said, “… you

weren’t informed of the material you were working with.” Later in his evidence he said that

asbestos rope had been called asbestos rope at the time, but that he had not been informed that

[29] In the course of Mr Brennan’s evidence objection was taken to his evidence regarding

the cutting and drilling of sections of asbestos to make them fit the boilers, on the basis that

there was no record for this line of evidence. I allowed the evidence to be led subject to

competency and relevancy, on the basis that it might be covered by the following averments:

“[Mr Sweeney”] was employeed as an Engineer Fitter. The boilers which were built in

the factory were lagged with asbestos insulation and required asbestos gaskets and the

use of asbestos rope for sealing doors and valves. William Sweeney used this asbestos

rope and gaskets and was in close proximity to insulators who were applying asbestos

in the form of ‘monkey dung’ to the pipes and boilers throughout the factory

At page 9C-E there then follows a detailed description of the production of asbestos paste or

monkey dung. Mr Di Rollo submitted that there had already been evidence led along similar

lines without objection. He had asked Mr McCluskey, in relation to the account he got from

Mr Watson, whether it was clear that asbestos was being broken up and cut.

[30] Mr Mackenzie maintained his objection at the close of proof. I sustain that objection.

The defenders are entitled to have notice of the processes that the pursuers say were carried

on and which resulted in exposure to Mr Sweeney. Although, for reasons I discuss more fully

below, it is very difficult to assess with any real accuracy the level of exposure of an individual

in a historical case, the nature of the processes undertaken will have a bearing on the evidence

available to the court about exposure levels. The literature includes different assessments as to

the asbestos fibres per millilitre of air generated by different processes. The general averment

about boilers being lagged with asbestos insulation is in the context of a passage of pleadings

which then specifies three particular ways in which asbestos was used. The defenders were

entitled to proceed on the basis that it was about those three uses of asbestos that evidence

would be led. I narrate the evidence that he gave, but I have excluded, in assessing liability,

his evidence regarding the lagging of the boilers with light coloured powdery material, and

the shaping and cutting of it with cutting tools and drills to get it to fit. I did not consider that

the absence of objection to the question mentioned in the preceding paragraph barred

objection at the point it was taken. I had in mind also what was, in my view, the ambiguous

answer given by Mr McCluskey, which was, “He [Mr Watson] spoke about dust being

released from those processes.” I discuss the significance of that answer more fully below. It

was not clear to me that Mr Watson had given an account of processes of the sort mentioned

[31] As regards the lagging of boilers, Mr Brennan said that once he and his colleagues had

finished, other employees would move in and lag it to insulate it, and someone would then

put sheet metal around it to hold it together. The lagging was light coloured powdery

material. The people working with it shaped it and cut it to get it to fit. A white or light

coloured dust was produced as a result. It got on his clothes and he breathed it in. He did not

remember receiving any warnings about it or there being any precautions in force related to

its use. This happened regularly throughout the time he was working in the assembly shop.

Anyone working as a fitter assembling boilers would be in a similar position to his own.

[32] The product would be worked and shaped by cutting tools and drills. The dust was

not just in the air but lay on the metal work he was working on. Insulating material and dust

lay about the floor. Asbestos cloth seal was used to seal boiler doors. It was shaped using

shears. It was called asbestos cloth at the time, but no-one knew it was “bad for you”.

Mr Brennan did not know Mr Sweeney. He confirmed that most fitters would use asbestos

rope, also known as asbestos packing, to pack steam valves. It would be cut with a knife and

sometimes it had to be hammered down to get it into the required shape. He saw monkey

dung used. If there were gaps or spaces, employees would mix monkey dung and use it as a

paste to fill in the gaps, using their hands. It was mixed in a drum using a big stick. Its

production generated dust. “The insulating boys” worked with the monkey dung. In the

assembly shop where he had worked for around 12-15 months that work would be going on

[33] Mr Brennan acknowledged that he had himself thought about making a claim against

the defenders himself in relation to his time working there, and that he was a client of

Thompsons. He denied that he was interested in giving evidence that might be helpful to his

[34] He accepted that insulation would generally be applied to boilers at the end of their

production. He agreed that the premises were very large, and composed of many buildings.

He had worked in five of them during his time as an apprentice. These were assembly, tubing

and manifold, the drum shop, the foundry, and one other that he could not recall. He

described the tubing and manifold department as being housed in a building perhaps seven

times the length of Parliament Hall. He was referred to 7/6 of process, which he agreed was a

plan of the premises, showing a number of buildings separated in some instances by railway

tracks. The drum shop had been of a similar size to the tubing and manifold building. The

foundry was about two-thirds of the size of the drum shop. The assembly department was

perhaps five or six times the size of Parliament Hall. Mr Brennan was referred also to an

organisational chart at 7/7 of process, but was not able to assist with some of the terminology

mentioned on it as apparently defining different operations. He said he had worked with

superheaters and economisers in the tubing and manifold areas, and with boiler structures in

the assembly shop. He was shown a diagram of a boiler on page 16 of 7/7, and said that that

type of boiler would be assembled on site; it would be manufactured at the defenders’

[35] He was asked whether engineers would work in one place, and replied that as an

apprentice he had been asked to move from department to department to learn as many skills

as possible, but that he could not say that an engineer would be asked to move. He accepted

that time-served fitters could serve in any one of a number of departments.

[36] In re-examination he stated that the processes and use of asbestos he had described

[37] Robin Howie is an occupational hygienist, and is aged 72 years. He has been a

member of the Institute of Occupational Medicine since 1970. His curriculum vitae (6/56)

provides a synopsis of his career. For much of his career before 1995 he was involved in work

to assess the effectiveness of respirator equipment. He has published extensively on subjects

related to asbestos exposure. Since 1995 he has had his own business, Robin Howie

Associates. Before 1995 he had some involvement in cases regarding allegations of exposure

to asbestos, but most of his work in that area has been since 1997. He has prepared around

[38] It appeared from Mr Howie’s report that he had had access to a statement from

Mr Watson that was not before the court, and a statement from Mr Brennan, but he confirmed

that, having heard Mr McCluskey’s account of what Mr Watson had told him, and

Mr Brennan’s evidence, he saw no reason to alter his opinion. He had not regarded

Mr Brennan’s evidence as significant in forming his opinion, but had regarded the account

deriving from Mr Watson as important. His opinion was predicated on its accuracy.

[39] Mr Howie gave evidence that mesothelioma was related to asbestos exposure in 99% of

cases. He had previously been involved in cases involving persons who had worked with

boilers. These most frequently involved the repair and demolition of boilers in the place in

which those boilers had been installed and had operated. Often they involved strippers

coming to strip boilers for demolition, and stripping lagging from them, rather than applying

[40] Asbestos lagging would be applied to boilers and associated components. The type of

asbestos used had varied over time. Mr Howie explained that principally blue asbestos

(crocidolite) and brown asbestos (amosite) were used. White asbestos (chrysotile) was

hydrophilic, so was not used. Crocidolite was used until the mid 1960s, and amosite

thereafter. Crocidolite was the most toxic form. The risk of mesothelioma from crocidolite

exposure was five times greater than from amosite exposure. Fibre for fibre, the risk from

crocidolite was one hundred times greater than that from chrysotile.

[41] Mr Howie had considered published literature in relation to the concentrations of

asbestos dust (in fibres/ml) generated by the preparation and use of monkey dung. He had

taken a figure of 240 fibres/ml for the preparation of insulation paste, and 30 fibres/ml for its

application. He had considered Harries PG (1971) Asbestos dust concentrations in shiprepairing:

A practical approach to improving asbestos hygiene in naval dockyards, Annals of Occupational

Hygiene, 14; 241-254 (“Harries”); Leathart GL and Sanderson JT (163) Some observations on

asbestos, Annals of Occupational Hygiene, 6, 65-74 (“Leathart and Sanderson”); and Cross AA

et al (1971) Practical Methods for protection of men working with asbestos materials in shipyards,

Safety and Health in shipbuilding and shiprepairing, pg 93-101, International Labour Organisation,

Geneva (“Cross”). Harries had arrived at a figure of 190 fibres/ml mean for the preparation

and application of the paste (from a range of 48-377 fibres/ml, and a range of 0.1-61 fibres/ml,

in the general atmosphere aboard vessels during refitting. Leathart and Sanderson gave a

figure of 280 fibres/ml for the preparation of the paste. Cross cited data indicating that

application of pipe lagging containing 15% of asbestos generated 40-60 fibres/ml. Mr Howie’s

letter included a copy of a photograph (Figure 3) showing a photograph of a worker applying

insulation paste. It showed his overalls discoloured with the insulation material. Mr Howie

described the preparation and application of insulation paste as a very dirty process.

[42] Leaving aside the application of insulating paste, the process of cutting other asbestos

material would still produce dust. Materials such as caposite could come in preformed

sections. Cutting and handling freeform sections would generate dust. The exposure level

would be somewhere in the region of 30-40 fibres/ml. The asbestos used would always be

crocidolite or amosite. Asbestos cloth or rope would probably contain amosite, as crocidolite

was more expensive. Amosite rope was widely used wrapped around pipes, and gaskets for

boiler doors could well also have been amosite. Amosite was resistant to corrosion from the

furnace fumes. Chrysotile might be used if it was at a location distant from the furnace fumes.

[43] Counsel asked Mr Howie whether he was aware of literature showing that asbestos

was used in the manufacture of boilers. He was aware of a book dating from 1955 by giving

information about the use of asbestos. It had been published in the United States and might

not apply directly to operations in the United Kingdom. This was a booklet entitled: Steam: its

generation and use, bearing to be produced by The Babcock and Wilcox Company, New York

[44] Diagrams on page 14-6 of 6/57 showed the use of asbestos in expansion joints and

brickwork. Figure 19 on page 14-16 referred to the use of magnesia block, which was a solid

form of insulation containing 15% amosite by weight, and to plastic insulation, which was a

further form of asbestos material. Pages 14-15 to 14-16 contained a section dealing with

insulating materials. These included: diatomaceous earth base blocks, some of which

contained mineral wools and asbestos fibres; magnesia block, containing 15% amosite; high

temperature plastic, which was mineral wool fibre, which would have been crocidolite or

amosite, and more likely the former, given the date of publication; and asbestos cement.

Figure 28 showed the application of plastic insulation over steel mesh. In the 1950s that would

have probably contained crocidolite, and by the 1960s more likely amosite. Plastic insulation

[45] Asbestos had been useful because it was a very efficient insulation material, resistant to

sulphurous fumes and high temperatures, and because it was cheap. When it was formed,

and broken and cut, it produced dust. Breathing in asbestos dust had the potential to cause

harm. That was recognised in a 1931 publication by Merewether and Price. That work

considered exposure in spinning mills making asbestos fabrics, and concluded that the most

heavily exposed persons had the highest rates of asbestosis, and developed it at the earliest

ages. A relationship between tuberculosis and asbestosis came to be recognised, with one

third of deaths from asbestosis occurring in persons with both diagnoses. By the late 1930s the

risk of cancer from asbestos exposure came to the fore, and was addressed by the Factories

[46] Mr Howie referred to a 1960 paper by Wagner as a bombshell. It linked mesothelioma

to asbestos exposure. Some of the cases of mesothelioma studied occurred in persons who

did not work in asbestos mines, but lived in nearby townships. He referred to a further paper

by Wagner (Wagner JC (1963) Asbestos dust exposure and malignancy. XIV International

Congress on Occupational Health, Madrid (6/52)). It related that more than half of the cases of

mesothelioma studied in the Cape asbestos fields in South Africa had occurred in individuals

who had never worked in the asbestos industry, but had lived in the vicinity of the mines and

mills. Newhouse and Thompson (Newhouse ML and Thompson H (1965) Mesothelioma of

pleura and peritoneum following exposure to asbestos in the London area, British Journal of

Industrial Medicine, 22, 261-296 (6/50)) in 1965 produced a paper containing evidence that

neighbourhood exposures might be important. The paper contained findings that had been

presented at a conference in 1964. Nine of the cases studied were people whose relatives had

worked with asbestos. The paper related: “The most usual history was that of the wife who

washed her husband’s dungarees or work clothes.” The authors concluded; “There seems

little doubt that the risk of mesothelioma may arise from both occupational and domestic

exposures to asbestos.” This paper was the first time that environmental exposure had been

discussed in a coherent, scientific manner, supported by evidence. It led to an article in the

Sunday Times on 31 October 1965 by Dr Alfred Byrne, Medical Correspondent (6/42). It

“A disquieting “new” occupational disease capable of killing not only the exposed

workman but also perhaps his womenfolk and even people living near his place of

work is the subject of intensive behind- the-scenes activity by British scientists, experts

on industrial health and representatives of at least to Government ministries.

Of nine patients whose relatives worked with asbestos, seven were women. The most

usual history was that of the wife who used to wash her husband’s dungarees or work

clothes. In one instance a relative said that the husband, a docker, came home ‘white

with asbestos’ every evening for three or four years, during which the wife brushed

[47] Mr Howie was aware that the defenders had a Dr Rose working in their safety

department. He would have expected an occupational health doctor to have been aware of

publications in the British Journal of Occupational Medicine. The 1960 Wagner paper had

been very heavily cited in in that journal, as it had made a link between mesothelioma and

asbestos exposure. The journal was the primary journal, in the field of occupational health, at

the time in the United Kingdom. By 1960 there were already occupational exposure limits in

relation to asbestos, and exposures were to be reduced to the lowest levels practicable, in

accordance with the Factories Acts. In order to effect such a reduction, an employer would

have to take measurements. If they did not, they would not know whether they were

complying with their obligations. It was not common for employers to take measurements,

but a number of companies offered commercial services in relation to measuring the levels of

dust, noise and other sorts of contamination in factories. Any competent employer could have

asked the Factories Inspectorate for guidance. He was familiar with histories of persons

seeing dust in the environment. As to the exposure of persons such as the deceased, he

referred to page 268 of 6/50, which is a table summarising certain aspects of the authors’

research findings. It includes three specified instances of individuals who had washed the

[48] A simple precaution would have been to have work clothes washed at the work place.

At many workplaces, employees changed their clothes at work. It was one that he understood

from the evidence that the defenders had eventually taken. The deceased had identified a

particular property at which she was living until 1973. Mr Sweeney left the defenders in 1971.

By the time he went back the couple were living at a different address.

[49] The only published reference of which he was aware to the fibres generated by shaking

out clothing was that in Maguire v Harland and Wolff plc [2005] EWCA Civ 01. The experts in

that case had agreed a figure of 30-100 fibres/ml. Mr Howie had not himself carried out any

experimental work in relation to the matter. He had assumed that the deceased carried out

this exercise two or three times each week for between 5 and 15 seconds at a time, and had

calculated her cumulative exposure. He had assumed that the dust contained amosite, as the

[50] The deceased’s exposure up to 1971 materially increased the risk of her contracting

mesothelioma. Her exposure between 1965 and 1971 would have increased the risk, at least

fortyfold compared with the idiopathic risk of contracting mesothelioma. The idiopathic risk

was one per million persons per year. Had Mr Howie been assuming exposure to crocidolite

rather than amosite, the risk would have been four or five times higher. Mr Howie initially

offered a figure in the region of a 200-400 fold increase in risk of contracting mesothelioma,

compared with the idiopathic risk. He was asked about the significance of a period of five to

six years (1966 onwards) and in the light of that modified the figure to at least forty, as I

understood it to reflect that the idiopathic risk figure he had given was one calculated on a

yearly basis, and that the correct idiopathic risk figure over a five year period would be higher

[51] The risk from chrysotile would have been much lower. The substance was 100 times

less potent. It was less toxic, and it was also difficult to render it airborne, so high

concentrations were not usually generated. Mr Howie was asked about the possibility of

exposure to asbestos while working in a garage. He responded that so far as he was aware

[52] He was of the view that the risk from chrysotile in a garage was insignificant compared

to the risk from amosite during the 1960s. He also regarded the latent period for

mesothelioma as of relevance in assessing the significance of the deceased’s work in the

[53] In his letter, Mr Howie had stated that 31 October 1965 was the latest date at which a

reasonable employer would have been fully aware of the mesothelioma risk associated with

work with asbestos and of the risks from exposure to environmental levels of asbestos – that

being the date of the article by Dr Byrne. In his oral evidence, however, he offered the view

that so large an employer as the defenders should have been aware from 1960 – that is, the

date of the earlier Wagner article – because it indicated a risk to those living in townships

associated with mines, and not just those working in asbestos mines. When writing the letter

he had not appreciated how large an employer the defenders had been.

[54] In cross-examination counsel suggested to Mr Howie that his use of words such as

“bombshell” and “lesser evil” were inappropriate and suggested advocacy, rather than

independence, on his part. He responded that both expressions had appeared in the

published literature. He regularly received instructions from Thompsons, and wrote

between 30 and 50 reports each year. He was asked whether he had produced reports for

insurers or defenders. His evidence was that he had produced between 10 and 20 in total, but

[55] He had been sent a short email, and asked to look at the likely levels of asbestos

exposure in this case. He was asked to provide some “early information” as soon as he could.

It was effectively to be an early indication of his view. He accepted that he was working from

literature relating to shipbuilding, but said that he needed to work from the literature that was

available. Although he had referred in the course of his evidence to information from Cape,

which was not produced, he had not used it to consider exposure levels, but to consider the

content of various types of materials. In relation to exposure levels, he had considered

[56] Mr Howie was referred to 6/48 of process, a document produced in 1967 by the

Ministry of Labour and HM Factory Inspectorate, entitled “Problems arising from the use of

Asbestos”. It was a memorandum of the Senior Medical Inspector’s advisory panel.

Paragraph 13 reflected the understanding, as at 1967, that the Asbestos Industry Regulations

applied only to the asbestos industry itself. Mr Howie accepted that, but explained that that

understanding had subsequently been shown to be mistaken. The document (page 10), placed

boiler making in the category of involving handling asbestos occasionally. The emphasis had

[57] Under reference to Cross (6/43) and a 1968 article by Harries (6/45) Mr Howie accepted

that shipbuilding and ship repairing in the naval dockyards were regarded as the most acutely

problematic workplaces. He accepted that a passage in 6/45, at page 136, read:

“Most of the work carried out in the Royal Yards is refitting and repairing ships,

rather than shipbuilding which accounts for most of the work undertaken in the

civilian yards. The extent of the refits also differs in that naval refits are usually

much more extensive and often involve the removal and replacement of nearly

all the insulating material in machinery spaces. As the removal of lagging

material gives rise to more dust than its application these are very important

For these reasons, and for the many engineering and constructional differences

between naval and merchant ships, I believe that the overall exposure to asbestos

is likely to be higher in the Naval dockyards than in their civilian counterparts.”

[58] Mr Howie’s estimates of exposure were derived from the 1971 Harries article (6/44)

and Leathart and Sanderson. In relation to 6/44, he had used the data from page 247,

although he had not specifically relied on it. He accepted that, in general, there was a higher

concentration, expressed in mean fibres/cm2 in relation to the breathing zone, as compared

with the general atmosphere. The breathing zone was normally within 30cm of the mouth

and nose. In the main it was true to say that the further one got form the source of airborne

dust, the lower the exposure would be. There were formulae for calculating that diminution

if someone was out of doors and there were no intervening air flow movements. In order to

employ such a formula, one would need to know about more about the space and the level

[59] Counsel asked Mr Howie why there was no reference in his letter to the possibility

that Mr Sweeney might have had no exposure to asbestos. Mr Howie responded that this

was because, on the basis of the information with which Mr Howie had been provided, it

looked as if it was likely that Mr Sweeney had been exposed to asbestos. He had not used

the highest figures available to him from the literature. He explained that Harries, at

page 246 of 6/44, described levels of exposure for two separate tasks, that of removing

asbestos plastic mix from a container, and that of mixing it with water in a bucket. Leathart

and Sanderson had referred to a combination of the two activities.

[60] Mr Howie agreed that he had seen no information to suggest that 6/49, which was a

letter from the Ministry of Labour and National Service, dated August, 1945, concerning the

use of asbestos in shipbuilding and shiprepairing, had been sent to the defenders. He

accepted that in heavy industry, such as that operated by the defenders, there tended to be

dirty processes unrelated to asbestos. Overalls might be dirty from substances other than

[61] He accepted that chrysotile was the form of asbestos most widely used in industry.

He explained that that was by a factor of about 10 to 21, both before and after 1976. He

agreed that the diagram of the boiler in 6/57 at page 14-15 looked similar to the type of boiler

shown at page 16 of 7/7, and discussed in Mr Brennan’s evidence. He accepted that there

was no explicit reference to the presence of asbestos in the discussions of mineral wool or

[62] The body of knowledge regarding asbestos had been developing in the 1960s and

1970s. The purpose 6/48 had been to look outside the asbestos industry itself as to where

else risks might exist. Table 4 in that document reflected the various industries considered

by the advisory panel. The panel (paragraph 12) extrapolated a figure of 20,000 thought to

be using or manipulating asbestos outside the asbestos industry, but that did not include

those exposed by reason of working near where asbestos was manipulated. Paragraph 37

“It seems important to us that the problem of mesothelioma in association with

asbestos exposure or asbestosis should however be kept in proper perspective. The

great public interest being taken in these tumours at this time may otherwise readily

develop into a stage in which their importance as a hazard even to asbestos workers

Much has been written about the mesothelioma problem as it affects the public at

large either from accidental exposure to asbestos dust produced by others or even

through residence in the neighbourhood of an asbestos factory. We do not at the

present time know the precise incidence of mesothelioma in the population

generally. The total of mesothelioma cases collected over a period of many years in

Great Britain is around 200, most of which have been diagnosed in the last fifteen

years. The incidence is certainly rising but even so, the total must be viewed against

a total of 21,476 deaths in males and 3,895 deaths in females in 1964 alone from

cancer of the trachea, bronchus and lung. In the last six months 17 cases of

mesothelioma have been reported to the PRU, but these figures are known to be an

Mr Howie accepted that the authors were trying to put the thread from mesothelioma into

perspective. He was referred to a further passage in the same document, at paragraphs 55

“55. So far as asbestosis (and hence asbestos related bronchial carcinoma) is

concerned, we believe that it is possible by the application of the best current

engineering practice to create an environment in which the chances of developing

asbestosis of a compensatable degree are small. Even here, the question arises as to

what is meant by ‘compensatable asbestosis’ as X-ray films fall on a spectrum at one

end of which are the gross changes characteristic of frank asbestosis and at the other

end, changes which, although due to asbestosis, are slight. Much more research in

56. In the light of present knowledge, we must record our opinion that where

asbestos, particularly crocidolite is used, some risk of mesothelioma will have to be

accepted. At this time we do not know the level of exposure below which the risk

may be negligible. It seems quite possible that those mesotheliomas which appear to

be related to environmental and home exposures were in people who had quite an

appreciable dose of asbestos. There is also some evidence, relating to past

occupational exposures which supports the view that, if occupational exposures are

reduced to the levels indicated in the above paragraph, the risk of developing

mesothelioma is greatly reduced. The latent period between first exposure to

asbestos and the development of mesothelioma is very long, in some cases up to 30-

40 years or more. Cases in South Africa have occurred at a relatively young age

apparently following exposure in childhood. Some advantage might be gained in

restricting industrial exposure to asbestos to persons over 40 years of age or even

older. We recommend that the practicability of doing this should be discussed in

Mr Howie accepted that this reflected thinking in 1967 that there were measures that could

be taken to reduce exposure, and at that time there was no blanket ban on import or use of

[63] In relation to the earlier period, and in particular to 1960, counsel asked Mr Howie

about 7/10, a document entitled “Toxic Substances in Factory Atmospheres”, produced in

March 1960 by the Ministry of Labour and the Central Office of Information. Under

reference to the content of the introduction, counsel suggested to Mr Howie that in 1960

there were not readily accessible methods of measuring asbestos in the air. Mr Howie

disagreed with that proposition, saying that methods had been available from the 1920s and

30s at the time of Merewether’s work; the Sanderson publication from 1963 contained

measurements. He referred to the use of a thermal precipitator, widely used in coal mines.

He accepted that it might not have been widely deployed in factories in 1960. That did not,

however, mean that there were no duties to control exposure to materials in factories at that

time. The document provided a permissible concentration (in PPCC – particles per cubic

centimetre of air). The figure for asbestos was 177. That equated to 5 fibres/ml. Mr Howie

said that it was not the case that 177 PPCC was the point at which an employer should take

action to control dust; it was the point at which further action was necessary to control dust.

[64] Asked about 6/50, he accepted that the relatives of the nine patients referred to

would have been workers who would have been heavily exposed to asbestos, even by the

[65] Counsel referred Mr Howie to 7/11, issued by the Department of Employment and

Productivity, entitled “Standards for Asbestos dust concentration for use with the Asbestos

Regulations 1969 – Technical Data Note 13”. It provided guidance as to how HM Inspectors

of Factories would interpret the expression “dust consisting of or containing asbestos to such

an extent as is liable to cause danger to the health of employed persons”. It had come about

because of the promulgation of the Asbestos Regulations 1969. It was produced in 1970.

Mr Howie agreed that it had come about because of the concerns raised by Newhouse and

Thompson. Where chrysotile and amosite were concerned, no action would be taken where

the average concentration of asbestos dust over any 10 minute sampling period was less

than 2 fibres/ml. Where over a period of 4 hours the average concentration was 2 fibres/ml

or more, the extent to which HM Factory Inspectorate would require the standard of control

to be improved would depend on the amount by which it exceeded that figure, and the

duration of exposure. When the concentration was greater than 12 fibres/ml over a

10 minute period, a further sample would be taken before action to enforce regulation 7 or 8

[66] The regulations were said to apply in full wherever workers were engaged in

processes involving crocidolite. An approved respirator would require to be worn unless

the concentration in the breathing zone of the worker could be maintained below

0.2 fibres/ml. Although an employer might not be breaching a regulation by failing to take

samples himself, Mr Howie commented that the numbers given in the document depended

on observations taken by sampling. An employer who did not take samples could not

assume that the conditions in his premises complied with the standards in the documents.

A sensible employer would want to make sure that he was not creating a risk, and was

complying with the regulations in the way that they were understood by the Inspectors of

[67] Mr Howie accepted, under reference to plans of the defenders’ premises that they

had operated a very large industrial site. Mr Brennan had worked in a number of different

buildings on either side or railway lines that cut through the middle of the site. Even in the

context of a building five or six times the size of Parliament Hall, it was in his view unlikely

that Mr Sweeney would have had no exposure to asbestos unless he worked upwind of the

relevant process at all times. He would assume that he sometimes worked upwind and

sometimes downwind. He was not making a conjecture, but trying to apply the data he had.

[68] Mr Howie was then asked about the deceased’s employment records from the

Department of Work and Pensions (7/1). Mr Di Rollo took objection to this line of

questioning. I allowed the evidence to be led subject to competency and relevancy. The

production bore to be a form signed by the deceased in which she stated that she used to

work in a car show room with a garage, that she believed asbestos materials were used in

the building itself; that she remembered lots of dust in the parts department; that her

husband worked with asbestos, but that she believed she was exposed in her own right. He

said that there might have been asbestos in brake linings. That would have been chrysotile.

He would have discarded late exposure to chrysotile in the context of information about

exposure to asbestos on her husband’s clothing, and the latency period of mesothelioma.

[69] Dr Semple is a retired general physician, with a particular interest in lung disease.

He worked in Inverclyde Royal Hospital between 1979 and 2008. He prepared a report,

6/30, in the present case. There was no dispute that the deceased died of malignant pleural

mesothelioma. In his opinion a history of brief or low level exposure should be considered

sufficient for mesothelioma to be designated as occupationally related. He had encountered

several similar cases in which a wife had been exposed to asbestos and had gone on to

develop mesothelioma. He had examined his own case records. He had considered

604 records, 37 of which related to women. Of those 37, 26 had been occupationally related,

and 11 women had been exposed by way of cleaning her husband’s overalls. As I

understood his evidence, one of these cases had been connected to employment with the

[70] He had been aware that the deceased worked in a garage from 1979 until the

mid 1980s. In garages one recognised means of exposure was removing and replacing

Ferodo brake pads. He had presumed she had not worked as a mechanic herself. He had

never seen brake pads removed, but he understood that the material was often friable when

removed, and that sometimes it had to be filed, or a hole bored in it, for fitting. Those

circumstances caused there to be dust in the atmosphere. He had not seen secondary

exposure from brake pads. The fitting and removal of brake pads would be less likely to

affect anything other than their immediate environment. Persons fitting or manufacturing

boilers would be followed closely by laggers mixing monkey dung, and causing a lot of dust

in the atmosphere. As he understood it, in the assembly of boilers fitters and laggers would

work alongside each other. The scenario suggested in this case, of the deceased’s being

exposed to asbestos from Mr Sweeney’s clothes, did not surprise him at all.

[71] Dr Semple was referred in the course of his evidence to histories recorded in the

medical records of the deceased (6/31) as apparently having been given by her. A letter from

a consultant respiratory physician to a consultant in clinical oncology dated 1 June 2015

(page 234) related: “She never smoked. Her late husband was an engineer fixing boilers

and she washed his clothes.” Similar references to Mr Sweeney’s work appeared at pages 56

[72] Mr Di Rollo renewed his objection to reference to material in 7/1 and 7/2 of process,

relating to applications made to the DWP. These had not been proved.

[73] He turned to matters which were not in dispute, namely the employment histories of

[74] The pursuers’ position was that the end point of the deceased’s exposure was 1971.

That was when Mr Sweeney’s employment with the defenders ended for the time being. On

the deceased’s account, overalls were still being brought home at that time.

[75] As to whether and to what extent Mr Sweeney was exposed to asbestos fibres while

in employment with the defenders, Mr Di Rollo relied on the content of the deceased’s

statement supported by the brief accounts recorded in her medical records of the histories

she had given to those treating her; the evidence of Mr McCluskey as to what Mr Watson

told him; and the evidence of Mr Brennan. Mr Howie had also given evidence as to the

materials he would have expected to be involved in the boilermaking process. That

supported the information in the evidence deriving from Mr Watson and in Mr Brennan’s

evidence. The evidence given about the use of asbestos in the construction of boilers had not

been seriously challenged, and had not been contradicted by any other evidence. I could be

satisfied on the evidence that Mr Sweeney worked in the same area as laggers and that the

processes they engaged in generated substantial quantities of dust.

[76] It was unrealistic to think that there could ever be a scientifically accurate way of

assessing and presenting to the court the levels of dust actually generated. What the court

required to consider was whether the work would produce significant quantities of dust.

The evidence presented a description of asbestos materials being used consistently

throughout the period of Mr Sweeney’s employment. There was no reason to think that the

manufacturing process changed or that different materials were used. The content of 6/57

tended to support the proposition that asbestos was used in the manufacture of boilers

generally. The type of asbestos used would have been amosite or crocidolite, having regard

[77] In support of the submission that it was necessary for the court to take a practical

approach to the questions before it cases of historical industrial disease, Mr Di Rollo referred

[78] Harris was a successful appeal against the dismissal of a claim for noise-induced

deafness, in which the alleged exposure was between 1974 and 1999. In the course of the

appeal the defendant attacked the basis on which the first instance judge had made findings

about the level of the claimant’s exposure to noise. The judge had noted that exposure to

sound above a particular level every day through a working life would involve a particular

measurable risk, whereas exposure on just a few days of that working life would not. He

had not been referred, in that context, to where the “risk-line” should be drawn

(paragraph 17). He had therefore formulated the question for the court in broad terms,

namely whether the claimant had been regularly, and over a significant period, been

exposed to noise at a level of 85 dB(A) leq or more (paragraph 16). The Court of Appeal

determined, at paragraph 19, that the first instance judge had been entitled approach the

matter in the way that he did, and to reach the conclusions he did:

“19.The principal ground of attack was on the propriety of the Judge's approach to

the issue he was considering. In that connection, the Judge's formulation of the vital

question which he had to determine was whether the claimant had ‘regularly’ and

‘for a significant period’ been exposed to sound levels of 85dB(A)leq or above. As he

explained, the difficulty he faced on the evidence was the absence of any evidence as

to a ‘risk-line’. It has not been suggested that his formulation was wrong in law, or

even could be improved on. The only alternative, therefore, would have been for the

Judge to reject the claim simply on the basis that he had not been provided with a

risk-line. I do not think that would have been the appropriate course to take. Claims

for personal injury arising out of exposure to noise, vibration, or other health risks,

particularly where the exposure was over a long period of time in different

circumstances, notoriously give rise to difficulties. While it may be dangerous to

generalise, the cases demonstrate, and common sense and fairness require, that,

unless it is clear that decisive evidence would have been relatively easily available,

and that there was no good reason why it is not before the court, it is normally

wrong for the court simply to shelter behind the burden of proof and dismiss the

[79] Mr Di Rollo submitted that the court had to do its best with the material before it.

The court could be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that significant quantities of dust

containing asbestos were generated during the period of Mr Sweeney’s employment and

that as a result of his proximity to the dust, it would have got on to his clothing. The

estimates of exposure provided by Mr Howie were of assistance, but they were not really

necessary. Even had there been no evidence of the sort he provided, and the only evidence

was that asbestos was used to a significant extent, the court would have to consider and

assess that evidence and take a view as to whether or not a reasonable employer would have

taken precautions. Where asbestos dust was generated in a significant quantity and it was

reasonably foreseeable that that would cause harm, a reasonable employer exercising

reasonable care would not disregard the risk, but take precautions. Had the defenders

applied their mind, they would have taken precautions to protect someone in the position of

[80] The court was entitled to take into account the evidence given by Mr McCuskey.

Hearsay evidence was admissible. The deceased’s evidence was of limited assistance

because she was not able to say that she had been told much about the conditions in the

defenders’ premises. Mr Watson’s evidence was important, and the pursuers relied on it as

evidence of the processes that were being carried on. In the absence of contrary evidence

[81] There had been an objection to part of Mr Brennan’s evidence, but the record covered

processes of the types described by him. The pleadings were concerned with the use of

insulation materials in boiler making, and any respect in which they were manipulated in

order to fix them to the boilers was properly the subject of notice in them.

[82] Mr Di Rollo referred to the statutory duties incumbent on the defenders towards

Mr Sweeney under the Factories Acts of 1937 and 1961; had the defenders complied with

those duties then the deceased would not have been injured as she was. He accepted,

however, that he could not rely on the statutory duties to Mr Sweeney. The case relating to

the deceased was a common law case. That there were statutory duties to Mr Sweeney,

however, put the question of precautions into context. The evidence was that there were no

precautions at all. Mr Brennan’s evidence was that he was not warned about the use of

asbestos, and if he had not received a warning, that would indicate that Mr Sweeney had

not. In this case there was an obvious reasonable precaution, namely that the employee

changed at the factory gate, with the clothing used for work kept within the factory. It was a

[83] The court could disregard the only potential source of direct exposure in the

deceased’s own employment history. There was no evidence that she had been exposed,

and even if she had been, the exposure would have been far less likely to cause

mesothelioma, as the exposure would have been to chrysotile. The timing of the

employment also told against any exposure in that context as the cause of mesothelioma in

the deceased. The only known source of asbestos exposure was from Mr Sweeney’s

[84] Mr Di Rollo referred to MacDonald v National Grid Electricity Transmission plc

[2015] AC 1128. The case concerned the application of the Asbestos Industry Regulations 1931 and

the Factories Act 1937 where the claimant developed mesothelioma and his only known

exposure to asbestos was between 1954 and 1959 when he had driven a lorry to a power

station. In the course of his visits he would visit parts of the premises where lagging was

taking place. The Supreme Court determined that the 1931 regulations did not apply merely

to the asbestos industry, but also to any factory, workshop or part thereof where any of a

wide range of processes referred to in the preamble, including mixing asbestos, was carried

on. The duty under section 47 of the Factories Act 1937 to take practicable measures to

protect persons employed against inhalation of dust arose whenever a considerable quantity

of dust was given off in connection with a process carried on, and it was not necessary to

show that the quantity was considerable at the point of inhalation. Mr Di Rollo submitted

that the point to be taken was that dust was not good in a general sense, and that steps were

to be taken to reduce it to a minimum and prevent its accumulation. Section 47 applied to

substantial quantities of dust of any kind. The discussion in McDonald provided a context

[85] The most recent and most analogous authority was Maguire. Morland J had accepted

that during a period between 1961 and 1965 the risk of injury to the deceased, the wife of a

boilermaker employed in the defendants’ shipyard, was reasonably foreseeable and indeed

obvious.” The majority of the Court of Appeal, Mance LJ dissenting, decided that Morland J

had not been entitled to reach that conclusion on the evidence. Mr Di Rollo submitted that

his case did not depend on the proposition that the defenders knew or should have known

of the risk before 1965, because Mr Howie’s evidence established that there was a materially

increased risk of injury by reason of exposure from 1965 onwards. In seeking to support an

earlier date, Mr Di Rollo relied on Mr Howie’s evidence. He submitted that asbestos was

known to be dangerous well before 1960. The dust was known to be likely to cause a

difficulty to anyone who came into contact with it. Information about the danger from

mesothelioma was available by the beginning of the 1960s, and it was known that it would

not require much contact to give rise to the risk of that very grave disease.

[86] Mr Di Rollo referred extensively to Mance LJ’s dissenting judgment. Mance LJ had

taken a legitimate approach and it would be open to me to take a similar approach on the

evidence available in the present case. In any event, having regard to the 1965 Newhouse

and Thomson article, it could not be suggested that a reasonable employer would not

foresee the risk that a person in the deceased’s position would contract a fatal condition any

[87] Rice v Secretary of State for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2008] EWHC

3216 (QB) was instructive as to the approach taken to information about the risks of contact

with asbestos dust in 1960 and in 1966 (paragraphs 64-86). Baxter v Harland and Wolff

[1990] IRLR 516, a decision of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, emphasised that an employer

was under a duty to concern himself with matters of safety and to keep abreast with

contemporary knowledge in the field of accident prevention: paragraphs 4, 34.

[88] Mr Mackenzie sought absolvitor. He submitted that the pursuers had not proved

their case. The evidence demonstrated no more than a possibility that Mr Sweeney had

worked with or near asbestos, and that he had brought asbestos home with him as a result.

The evidence was so poor in quality that the court was being invited to speculate as to

where in the factory he worked; as to the likely level of any exposure to asbestos; how often

he worked with or near asbestos; and whether he had been exposed to asbestos after 1965. It

was likely that his clothes were dirty simply because he worked in heavy industry.

[89] He did not maintain any objection to the admissibility of Mr McCluskey’s evidence

about what the deceased and Mr Watson told him, but submitted that the authorities which

prohibited the admission of precognitions were relevant to the way in which I should

approach that evidence. He referred to F v Kennedy (No 2) 1994 SLT 1284, at 1288; Young v

National Coal Board 1960 SC 6, at 9; Anderson v Jas B Fraser & Co Ltd 1992 SL7 1129, at 1130;

[90] From these authorities the following propositions emerged. Care required to be

taken where statements were tainted with self-interest; where they had been elicited by

means of questions being put, particularly where there was no record of what questions had

been put; and where there were grounds for suspicion that the witness had been induced to

state the facts in the way most favourable to the person calling him.

[91] Mr Watson was contacted on the advice of the deceased and the first pursuer. He

knew Mr Sweeney and he wanted to help. Mr Brennan was a client of Thompsons. He had

an interest in giving evidence to assist the pursuers as it might assist his own position.

Mr Brennan’s evidence was of little relevance in the case in any event, because he did not

[92] Mr McCluskey’s notes of conversation with Mr Watson lacked detail. The

conversation had lasted only 15 minutes. The defenders’ organisation was a very complex

one involving very many different activities, something not explored with Mr Watson. It

was not clear whether Mr Watson had been talking about his time as an apprentice or the

[93] Mr Mackenzie did not suggest that Mr Brennan was not credible, or was consciously

fabricating evidence. Rather, he submitted that the process of being involved in litigation

had caused him unconsciously to exaggerate. He had carried out his own investigations

online. The effort of reconstructing experiences tainted the memory of the witness.

Mr Mackenzie referred to Prescott v University of St Andrews [2016] CSOH 3. He did not refer

to any particular passage, but I understood him to have in mind Lord Pentland’s

[94] When contemporaneous evidence (which I took to be a reference to the plans and

other documents put to Mr Brennan) was put to him, he was straightforward and was

reasonably able to point to the places where he had worked. I should accept as reasonably

accurate what he said about the size and scale of various buildings, and what went on in

them. Mr Mackenzie was not in a position to suggest that there was no asbestos in the

factory, but he submitted that there was a real risk that Mr Brennan might have exaggerated.

[95] Mr Howie was partisan, and should not be regarded as an independent expert.

Mr Mackenzie referred to the volume of reports he prepared for pursuers. He was not a

witness to fact, and could not speak to conditions in the defenders’ factory at the relevant

time. It was not appropriate that he should adopt results from a decided case and present

[96] Dr Semple had not been cross-examined, but his evidence did not advance matters so

far as the pursuers were concerned. He had volunteered the view that, in relation to boilers,

exposure in his experience tended to be in the removal and application of lagging on site.

[97] So far as the state of knowledge of the defenders regarding risk to persons such as

the pursuer was concerned, Mr Mackenzie submitted that there was a philosophical

difference between the approach of the majority and the minority in Maguire. What

underpinned the reasoning of the majority was the notion that until dangers are known

about, employers are not under any obligation proactively to “plough”, as he put it, to

discover them. They did not require to do any more than would a reasonably prudent man

exercising caution in his own affairs. That was the starting point. He referred in passing to

Jeromson v Shell Tankers (UK) Ltd [2001] ICR 1223 (sometimes referred to as The Cherry Tree),

referred to in the reasoning of Judge LJ. Nobody, he said, knew that what would now be

regarded as a horrifying level of exposure was significant. The toleration of 5 fibres/ml in

1960 (7/10) would now be seen as intolerably high. Even by 1970 the approach of the

Factories Inspectorate (7/11) was to tolerate certain levels. The common law did not

recognise what he described as a modern, zero-tolerance, approach to risk.

[98] By the time of the Sunday Times article an employer started to be “on notice” if

carrying out work of the types mentioned in the “relevant history” column in Section C:

exposure of relatives, in the appendix to the Newhouse and Thomson article (6/50); that is, if

the employer’s business gave rise to “heavy exposure” to asbestos.

[99] Mr Mackenzie commended the reasoning as expressed by Judge LJ at paragraphs 57

“57. As Morland J found, until 1965, notwithstanding the increasing concerns and

developing knowledge about the risks of exposure to asbestos among employees,

nothing in the literature warned against the risks of familial or secondary exposure.

On this topic, there was what appears to us now to have been a numbing silence.

Before 1965 neither the industry generally, nor those responsible for safety and

health, nor the Factory Inspectorate, nor the medical profession, suggested that it

was necessary, or even that it would be prudent, for risks arising from familial

exposure to be addressed by the industry. In truth, the alarm did not sound until

late 1965, when it began to be appreciated that there could be no safe or permissible

level of exposure, direct or indirect, to asbestos dust. Thereafter, the learning curve

about the risks arising from familial exposure was fairly steep. In my judgment,

however, Morland J’s conclusion that the risk of serious injury to Mrs Maguire’s

health was “reasonably foreseeable, indeed obvious” to her husband’s employers is

58. The issue remains whether Mrs Maguire has established that Harland & Wolff

were negligently in breach of the duty owed to her as the wife of an employee

working with and contaminated by asbestos dust. If so, liability would arise on the

somewhat unusual basis that they failed to address a risk which had not yet been

identified or addressed by anyone else, whether within or outside the industry. In

the absence of any evidence from any source whatever of contemporaneous insight

into familial risk, or any contemporaneous suggestion that the possibility of such

risks should be addressed, I am unable to accept that by not later than 1960, and

ahead of contemporary understanding, Harland & Wolff should have appreciated

that Mrs Maguire was at risk of pulmonary or other asbestos-related injury, and that

their failure to do so and to take appropriate precautions for her safety was

[100] By contrast, Mance LJ’s approach was predicated on the notion that absent

identification of the risk in the literature, an employer should have deduced for himself that

the risk existed, and acted to reduce it. He referred to paragraph 78:

“78. This brings me to the appellants’ straightforward submission that they were

not in breach of any duty towards Mrs Maguire, since it was not reasonably

foreseeable that their failure to take proper precautions would injure anyone except

Mr Maguire. For this submission to be good, it has to be possible to conclude (in Lord

Reid’s words) that it was not “reasonably foreseeable as liable to happen even in the

most unusual case” that Mrs Maguire, as a wife coming into contact with asbestos at

home, would incur any injury as a result of such contact. This is the submission that

Judge LJ and Longmore LJ would accept. They would accept it on the basis that no-

one had identified any such domestic or secondary risk in the literature, or so far as

appears elsewhere, before 1965. This is so, although, as Mr Allan QC conceded, many

employees had over the years often been unjustifiably exposed to asbestos dust by

their employers. However, whether anyone actually foresaw, or recorded that they

foresaw, the possibility of any general risk of this nature is not necessarily the same

question as whether a particular employer ought in particular circumstances

reasonably to have foreseen such a risk to the wives of its employees. Negligence and

reasonable foreseeability are always fact specific, and the factual features of the

present case are in my view critical. Here, we are concerned with a specific company

which was in serious breach of its duty of care to Mr Maguire in respects which can

be shown specifically to have increased the amount of such dust that he carried out

of the factory to his home, and where it was obvious that his wife would at home be

[101] Counsel submitted that insofar as Mr Di Rollo had, by reference to Mance LJ’s

judgment, sought to rely on the content of a 1959 report by the Chief Inspector of Factories, I

should have no regard to that, as the report was not produced and not been the subject of

[102] Mr Mackenzie referred, further, to Williams v University of Birmingham [2012] PIQR

P4, at paragraphs 31-38 and 44. He relied in particular on paragraph 44in the judgment of

“I accept, of course, that a judge must determine the degree of exposure to asbestos

fibres to which Mr Williams was actually subjected and whether that was a de

minimis exposure or a material exposure. If it was a de minimis exposure then there

could be no question of a breach of duty, as the judge recognised. But, assuming

that the exposure was more than de minimis, it was, in my view, necessary to ask a

further question. That is whether, given the degree of actual exposure, it ought to

have been reasonably foreseeable to the University (with the knowledge a reasonable

University should have had in 1974) that, as a result, Mr Williams would be likely to

be exposed to the risk of personal injury in the form of contracting mesothelioma.

To determine that question, it seems to me the judge had to make findings about (1)

the actual level of exposure to asbestos fibres to which Mr Williams was exposed; (2)

what knowledge the University ought to have had in 1974 about the risks posed by

that degree of exposure to asbestos fibres; (3) whether, with that knowledge, it was

(or should have been) reasonably foreseeable to the University that, with that level

of exposure, Mr Williams was likely to be exposed to asbestos related injury; (4) the

reasonable steps that the University ought to have taken in the light of the exposure

to asbestos fibres to which Mr Williams was exposed in fact; and (5) whether the

University negligently failed to take the necessary reasonable steps.”

[103] Counsel emphasised the need for courts to avoid any relaxation of the normal

requirements of evidence and proof under reference to a passage in Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK)

Ltd [2011] 2 AC 229 (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at paragraph 166):

“It is important that judges should bear in mind that the Fairchild exception itself

represents what the House of Lords considered to be the proper balance between the

interests of claimants and defendants in these cases. Especially having regard to the

harrowing nature of the illness, judges, both at first instance and on appeal, must

resist any temptation to give the claimant’s case an additional boost by taking a lax

approach to the proof of the essential elements. That could only result in the balance

He referred also to Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings 1956 SC (HL) 26: Lord Reid at 31.

[104] Mr Mackenzie maintained an objection to Mr Brennan’s evidence about the cutting of

preformed sections of asbestos. There was no notice of that line of evidence on record.

[105] This is, so far as I can tell, the first case in this jurisdiction in which a proof has taken

place dealing with secondary exposure, that is, exposure to someone in the home of an

employee, alleged to have caused mesothelioma in a secondary victim. In that context it is

surprising to find the pursuers’ expert witness being instructed less than two weeks before

the proof, and well after any report by him should have been lodged. The range of

publications made available to the court in England in Maguire was not before me. The 1959

report was not put in evidence. Mr Howie did not mention it in his letter, and was not

asked about it. I heard reference to it for the first time in submissions through the medium

of Mance LJ’s dissenting judgment in Maguire. Mance LJ’s reasoning was commended to

me, but without the provision to me of some of the material on which he relied. Mr Howie,

again, surprisingly, changed his position from that expressed in his letter in the manner I

have already described. The 1960 article on which he placed reliance was not before the

[106] There was considerable discussion in Maguire of the date at which it would have

been reasonably foreseeable to an employer – in that case a shipbuilder – that there was a

risk of injury to secondary victims. That discussion, however, was in the context of a first

instance decision that the risk was reasonably to have been foreseen before 1965. The

majority of the Court of Appeal rejected that conclusion. It did not involve any positive

finding as to when the risk should reasonably have become foreseeable. Another case

involving secondary exposure before 1965, Gunn v Wallsend Slipway & Engineering Co Ltd,

(unreported, 7 November 1988) appears to have failed for reasons similar to those given by

the majority in Maguire: Maguire, paragraph 55. Again, so far as I can tell, there has not

been a case in this jurisdiction making any positive finding as to when any employer should

have become aware of the risk of injury to secondary victims, far less one dealing

specifically with an employer such as the defenders, engaged in boilermaking. I was not

referred to any case in which there has been a positive finding of that sort. Further, at least

part of the pursuers’ submissions were directed at persuading me to adopt the position of

[107] I would have expected against that background the instruction of an expert witness,

with a particular view to presenting the relevant literature to the court, to be a matter of

priority. On Mr Howie’s own account, he received papers on 13 October 2017. He was not

instructed until after the pre-trial meeting of 2 October 2017. The pre-trial meeting did not

involve senior counsel or the solicitor advocate who conducted the proof for the pursuer.

Mr Howie received a short email and was asked to provide “early information” as soon as

he could. That seems little short of astonishing in the context I have just narrated, and

where I was told he had been on the list of witnesses “throughout”.

[108] In cases where industrial exposure took place a long time ago, there will sometimes

inevitably be difficulties of proof. These are more acute in a case of this sort, because the

most significant evidence is not that of the person who has allegedly been injured, but that

of the employee, who would be in a position to describe the working conditions. Where the

employee is the injured person, it will no doubt be obvious that evidence should be recorded

on commission at an early stage. I do not know whether anything much would have been

gained by recording the deceased’s evidence in that way. She died only a short time after

meeting with Mr McCluskey. The employee in this case, however, died several years before

the deceased became ill, and for reasons not apparently connected with exposure to

asbestos. There can be no criticism levelled at anyone for the absence of his evidence.

[109] Mr Watson, so far as I am aware, was the only witness identified as someone who

might be able to speak to the circumstances of Mr Sweeney’s employment and his exposure

to asbestos. I was not told when he died, or when the pursuers’ agents became aware that

he had died. There may have been no reason to suspect that he would die before the proof,

prompting steps to preserve his evidence by taking evidence on commission.

[110] A very precise picture of the duties of an employee cannot reasonably be anticipated

or expected in most cases involving exposure said to have started more than fifty years ago

and ended forty seven years ago. Even taking a more detailed statement, however, might

have provided an opportunity to gather evidence about frequency and duration of the

operations, the nature of the operations, and the exposure of Mr Sweeney in particular. In

cases involving witnesses already relatively elderly, perhaps particularly where exposure to

a potentially fatal contaminant is alleged, there might be some merit in the early preparation

of detailed affidavits, if not early consideration of taking evidence on commission.

Mr Watson was 78 years old when Mr McCluskey spoke to him. Life expectancies

nowadays are greater than in the nineteenth century, when the attainment by a witness of 70

years of age might have prompted steps to take evidence to lie in retentis (see Commission and

[111] I was not told of any attempt to ask the court to exercise its powers under

section 1(1A)(a) of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972. There are no motions

for commission and diligence at the instance of the pursuers within the process. It may be

that there were investigations in the background to which I am not privy that caused the

pursuers’ agents to think that asking the court to exercise its powers to find potential

witnesses, or to recover documents bearing on the conditions of employment would be

futile. I do not know, and it would therefore be inappropriate to be critical in relation to

those matters. But the condition in which the case came before the court, and in particular

the instruction of the expert witness only after the pre-trial meeting, suggest that the

necessity to prove the pursuers’ case only became properly focused for the pursuers’ agents

[112] Given what is now a long history of asbestos litigations, there should be very

considerable numbers of actions where there is no real dispute as to the likelihood of

exposure in a particular environment, and/or no real dispute as to resulting liability. Not

every case involving asbestos falls into that category. Prescott is an example. Parties should

be alert to identify cases which are likely to involve real dispute either as to exposure,

liability or both. That involves cooperation and candour on the part of those representing

insurers. It would be unfortunate if disproportionate resources came to be expended in the

investigation and preparation of cases where there should be no real dispute.

[113] There is no dispute that Mr Sweeney was employed by the defenders between 1962

and 1971, or that the deceased died because she contracted mesothelioma.

Was the deceased exposed to asbestos in the course of her own employment?

[114] I am not satisfied that the deceased was exposed to asbestos in the course of her own

employment, or that, if she was, she contracted mesothelioma as a result. There is no

dispute that she worked in the garages already referred to. Objection was taken, rightly, to

the evidence about the content of the DWP records. Those records were not the subject of

agreement and their authenticity was not established in any way in the course of the

evidence. I therefore leave them out of account. That the deceased was exposed to asbestos

while working at the garage is nothing more than speculation. The possible mechanism of

exposure that occurred to both Mr Howie and Dr Semple in the context of a garage was in

the removal and fitting of brake pads, tasks that would be carried out by mechanics. The

substance involved in that process was chrysotile, which is considerably less toxic than

either amosite or crocidolite. Had the substance been emitted, it would not have spread far.

It was difficult to render it airborne. Had I taken into account the content of the DWP

records, I would have regarded them as reflecting speculation on the part of the deceased. I

am satisfied by the evidence of Dr Semple that exposure to chrysotile between in the course

of the deceased’s employment in garages from 1979 is not likely to have caused the deceased

[115] I consider next when the defenders became subject to a duty of care to the deceased

by reason of their knowledge of a risk of secondary exposure affecting persons living with

employees exposed to asbestos at work. In his letter, Mr Howie identified 31 October 1965,

the date of Dr Byrne’s article in the Sunday Times, as the latest date at which a reasonable

employer would have been fully aware of the mesothelioma risk associated with work with

asbestos and of the risks from environment levels of asbestos. He wrote that such

appreciation would have been reinforced by the Ministry of Labour’s 1967 Memorandum

[116] In his oral evidence, Mr Howie altered his position, and offered an opinion that

relevant date was 1960. He said he had not appreciated how large an employer the

defenders had been. I find that difficult to understand, as his letter contains the following

“It is also considered that as major employer [sic] Babcock and Wilcox Ltd, whose

Renfrew establishment was described by Oakley (1953) as being ‘the largest

boilermaking works in the world’ would have had the resources to be fully up to

date with all contemporary legislation, regulations and guidance.”

[117] The Wagner paper from 1960, referred to by Mr Howie in the course of his oral

evidence was not produced. That is surprising and unsatisfactory, given the emphasis that

came to be placed on it in Mr Howie’s oral evidence. I was not shown any of its content. I

understand the 1960 paper to be Wagner JC, Sleggs CA and Marchand P (1960) Diffuse

pleural mesothelioma and asbestos exposure in the North Western Cape Province, British Journal of

Industrial Medicine 17, 260-271, which is cited in other papers which were lodged in process

and in Maguire. It does not seem to me that I could properly draw the significant conclusion

that the pursuers ask me to on the basis of a paper that was not part of the evidence in the

proof. On the basis of what Mr Howie said about its content, and the references to it that I

saw in the literature that was produced, it appears that it was a significant paper both in

associating mesothelioma with exposure to crocidolite and in mentioning some incidence of

disease in persons not working directly with asbestos, but living near to mines.

[118] Mr Howie himself acknowledged, however, that the 1965 paper represented a

significant development in its reliance on evidence presented systematically and

scientifically. Its content became more widely disseminated by virtue of Dr Byrne’s

reference to it in the Sunday Times. It was the paper which had precipitated the preparation

of the government publication 6/48 of process. That publication begins with a letter from the

Chief Inspector of Factories to the Minister of Labour, in the following terms:

“The health problems associated with occupational exposure to asbestos dust have

long been of considerable concern to HM Factory Inspectorate. Awareness of these

health risks has become much more widespread over the last two or three years and

public interest was particularly stimulated by the publication in the October 1965

issue of the British Journal of Industrial Medicine of an article by Dr Newhouse and

Dr Thomson about the association between exposure to asbestos and mesothelioma

[119] Mr Di Rollo relied heavily on Mance LJ’s dissenting judgment in Maguire. Mance LJ

placed considerable weight on the 1959 report. That report was not before me. It was not

introduced into evidence. Mr Howie was not asked in evidence in chief about its

significance, and was therefore not cross-examined about it. There was no evidence that a

properly diligent director of a large industrial concern such as the defenders should have

deduced from its content a risk to people living with its employees.

[120] In the first place, although I am attracted to Mance LJ’s analysis, I do not agree with

it. It is difficult, with the benefit of hindsight, not to wonder why it was that a substance

long recognised as dangerous should have been seen as foreseeably harmful only to those

employed where it was used, rather than others to whom they might bring contamination.

[121] That said, however, it does not appear to me to be sustainable to find as fact that a

reasonable and prudent industrial employer ought reasonably to have foreseen a risk of

injury to a secondary victim, where that was not a risk described in the relevant literature.

What Judge LJ relates at paragraph 57 in Maguire reflects the evidence in the present case:

before 1965 neither the industry generally, nor those responsible for safety and health, nor

the Factory Inspectorate, nor the medical profession, suggested that it was necessary, or

even that it would be prudent, for risks arising from familial exposure to be addressed by

[122] The position is different, in my view, from October 1965 onwards. Not only had a

very significant paper been published in a journal which should have been, on the

unchallenged evidence of Mr Howie, something known to those responsible for health and

safety within the defenders, but the subject had entered into more general public discourse

[123] I consider that from 31 October 1965 at latest, the defenders ought reasonably to have

foreseen that a risk of injury arose to persons in the position of the deceased by reason of

their employees transporting asbestos dust home on their clothing. It was suggested to

Mr Howie that the defendants in Maguire, as shipbuilders, might be in a different position

from the present defenders. I do, however, accept Mr Howie’s characterisation of the

defenders as a very large and significant industrial employer. They made boilers, and as I

have found below, boilers that were insulated with asbestos while still on their premises.

They were in my view under a duty to concern themselves with contemporary knowledge

in the field of occupational disease. That there were risks to health from working with

asbestos had been known for some considerable time before the 1960s, although knowledge

about the nature and extent of the risks expanded during and after the 1960s. The need to

consider risks arising from the use of asbestos would, or certainly should, already have been

known to the defenders. This is not a situation in which, in my view, any significant period

of time would have needed to elapse for a reasonable and prudent employer in the position

of the defenders to appreciate the significance of the information in the Newhouse and

Thompson report. The situation might conceivably be different for an employer of a

[124] I do not accept, as Mr Mackenzie suggested, that Newhouse and Thomson only put

employers on notice where there was particularly heavy exposure, or where the employee

primarily exposed worked in one of the jobs identified in section C of the appendix. No,

alternative, later date was proffered in evidence. That, of course, does not assist the

“No reasonably prudent employer would have known of the dangers of domestic

exposure before 1965, for the reason given by the majority in Maguire. …a precise

analysis of what the defenders ought to have known would, considering the lack of

evidence be futile. What ought to have been reasonably foreseeable to the defenders

depends on the facts and circumstances of Mr Sweeney’s working conditions.”

I disagree with the latter part of that passage. The Newhouse and Thompson paper includes

a number of cases of household exposure, arising in turn from a variety of different types of

employment. It includes a number of neighbourhood cases. It revealed a variety of

circumstances apart from direct or heavy industrial exposure in which contact with asbestos

might cause serious harm, namely mesothelioma. Dr Byrne did not miss the point. He

“Some of the current studies are designed to find out which variety of asbestos is the

most noxious, and the minimum dose required to produce malignant changes. This

could throw important light on the clinical disease for it seems that a very brief

[126] I note that Judge LJ recorded in Maguire that the literature subsequent to Newhouse

and Thompson did not suggest “an immediate rush to face up to the implications of the

Newhouse and Thompson papers, and perhaps more important, to the issues of

environmental and familial exposure.” Whether or not there was a rush to face up to the

implications, the implications were clearly there, and in my view gave rise to an obligation

to take reasonable care to avoid exposing family members to asbestos from workers’

[127] No evidence suggesting positively a later date than October 1965 was before me.

[128] Before turning to the evidence, I consider what it is that the pursuers have to prove

in order to succeed, aside from foreseeability of harm. Parties differed as to the factual

findings that would be required in order for there to be a finding of liability. On the

pursuers’ submissions, I required to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that

significant quantities of dust were generated during the period of Mr Sweeney’s

employment, and that as a result of his proximity to the dust, it would have got on to his

clothing. It was not necessary that I make a finding as to the level of exposure, in terms of

[129] Mr Mackenzie submitted that the court would have to be able to find (a) that

Mr Sweeney was so heavily exposed to asbestos while working for the defenders between

1963 and 1971 that he took home significant levels of asbestos on his boiler suit and/or

clothes; (b) the knowledge the defenders ought to have had about the risks posed at that

level; and (c) that, with that knowledge, it ought to have been reasonably foreseeable to the

defenders that asbestos related injury would arise from domestic exposure. It is implicit

from points (b) and (c) that there should be some finding as to the level of exposure, and

explicit from the reference that Mr Mackenzie made elsewhere in his submissions to

[130] I consider that any submission, had it been in the context of liability for injury to

Mr Sweeney himself, that had proceeded on the basis that there must be heavy or prolonged

exposure before liability could be established would have been bound to fail. That follows

from the analysis in Jeromson v Shell Tankers (UK) Ltd [2001] ICR 1223. Judge LJ made an

observation to similar effect in Maguire at paragraph 56. He was referring to passages in the

judgment of Hale LJ in Jeromson, with whom Cresswell LJ and Mantell LJ agreed, at

“37. Mr Mackay, on behalf of Shell, argues that where the issue is whether any risk

at all should have been identified, it is more appropriate to consider whether the

average as opposed to the potential exposure was sufficient to ring the bell.

However, where an employer cannot know the extent of any particular employee's

exposure over the period of his employment, knows or ought to know that exposure

is variable, and knows or ought to know the potential maximum as well as the

potential minimum, a reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive thought for

the safety of his workers, would have to take thought for the risks involved in the

potential maximum exposure. Only if he could be reassured that none of these

employees would be sufficiently exposed to be at risk could he safely ignore it.

51. Having reviewed the literature, the judge referred to the different conclusions

reached at first instance, by Waterhouse J in Gunn v Wallsend Slipway & Engineering

Co Ltd (unreported) 7 November 1988, and by Buxton J in Owen v IMI Yorkshire

Copper Tubes Ltd (unreported) 15 June 1995. He could not agree with Waterhouse J

that ‘the literature justifies the conclusion until 1960, that asbestosis was attributable

only to heavy and prolonged exposure’. He preferred the formulation of Buxton J

‘the difficulties related to and the threats posed by asbestos were sufficiently well

known, and sufficiently uncertain in their extent and effect, for employers to be

under a duty to reduce exposure to the greatest extent possible.’

He did so ‘in the context of the absence of any means of knowledge of what

constituted a safe level of exposure’. He accepted Mr Allan's submission that ‘a

reasonable employer, being necessarily ignorant of any future potential asbestos

exposure, cannot safely assume that there will never be sufficient cumulative

exposure’. In an uncertain state of knowledge, the risk could not (in the words of

Lord Upjohn in C Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos [1969] 1 AC 350, 422 c ) be ‘brushed aside as

52. The point which impressed the judge was the certain knowledge that asbestos

dust was dangerous and the absence of any knowledge, and indeed any means of

knowledge, about what constituted a safe level of exposure. Mr Mackay's argument

relies heavily on the explosion of knowledge which took place during the 1960s.

Only then did it become apparent that mesothelioma could result from very limited

exposure. In particular, it was only then that knowledge began to develop of the

risks to those outside the workplace, such as the wife washing her shipyard worker

husband's overalls (as in Gunn) or people living near to asbestos works. But just as

courts must beware using such later developments to inflate the knowledge which

should have been available earlier, they must beware using it to the contrary effect.

The fact that other and graver risks emerged later does not detract from the power of

what was already known, particularly as it affected employees such as these,

working in confined spaces containing a great deal of asbestos which might have to

be disturbed at any time. There is no reassurance to be found in the literature that the

level of exposure found by the judge in this case was safe and much to suggest that it

[131] By way of context, the level of exposure found by the judge in Jeromson is set out in

“39. He found that engineers would be exposed to dust when insulation had to be

stripped away and replaced. This happened most often when leaking joints had to be

repaired, but from time to time when pipes burst, and during dry docking. Three

experts (Mr Browne and Mr Deary for the claimants and Mr Finch for Shell) were

agreed that stripping asbestos lagging by crude methods gave rise to high

concentrations of visible dust, as did mixing asbestos powder with water to form a

plastic mix for new insulation and dry sweeping of asbestos debris. Cutting asbestos

lagging by handsaw gave rise to less high but still significant concentrations, and

handling asbestos mattresses in bad condition to moderately high concentrations. At

the time, however, there was no way of measuring such concentrations and until

1960 there were no published limits. The judge concluded that all but the last activity

would have given rise to concentrations substantially above even the lower limits set

in 1960 and the last to concentrations above those limits: ‘I am quite satisfied that

these five activities would have given rise to significant levels of visible dust …

clearly there to be seen, if considered by any careful employer.’ As for frequency:

‘In summary, I find that, at the material time, marine engineers employed by

Shell were liable and likely to encounter intense concentrations of asbestos dust,

on a regular basis. In the most part, these exposures would be for minutes rather

than hours, but on occasion, both at sea and in dry dock, the exposures would be

[132] The reasoning in Williams runs along rather different lines. The deceased was

exposed to asbestos as an undergraduate physics student between 1970 and 1974. He

carried out experiments in a tunnel in which pipes were lagged with asbestos. Tests carried

out in 2006 and 2007 identified crocidolite, amosite and chrysotile asbestos. The judge at

first instance made findings as to the presence of significant amounts of asbestos dust on the

floor of the tunnel, and that the lagging was in poor repair as at 1974. The exposure to

asbestos fibres was about 0.1 fibres/ml but below 0.2 fibres/ml. The claimant succeeded at

first instance, but the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the defendant in part because

the issue the court should have addressed was whether the degree of actual exposure made

it reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the deceased would be exposed to the risk of

[133] This aspect of the decision in Williams proceeds on an analysis that accepts that there

was (in that case, as at 1974) a level of exposure that the defendant was entitled to regard as

safe, and that the safe level was to be ascertained by reference to Technical Data Note 13

(7/11 in this process). That is apparent from paragraphs 60 and 61:

“60. In my view it was not sufficient for the judge only to make the general findings

on the state of knowledge about asbestos and mesothelioma noted at [53] above,

even if coupled with the finding that if the University had had a report about the

actual level of exposure to asbestos fibres as found, then the University would know

that to send someone into the tunnel inevitably carried ‘a risk’. I agree with Mr

Feeny’s submission that there could only be a breach of duty of care by the

University if the judge had been able to conclude that it would have been reasonably

foreseeable to a body in the position of this University in 1974 that if it exposed Mr

Williams to asbestos fibres at a level of just above 0.1 fibres/ml for a period of 52–78

hours, he was exposed to an unacceptable risk of asbestos related injury.

6. In my view the best guide to what, in 1974, was an acceptable and what was an

unacceptable level of exposure to asbestos generally is that given in the Factory

Inspectorate’s '‘Technical Data Note 13’ of March 1970, in particular the guidance

given about crocidolite. The University was entitled to rely on recognised and

established guidelines such as those in Note 13. It is telling that none of the medical

or occupational hygiene experts concluded that, at the level of exposure to asbestos

fibres actually found by the judge, the University ought reasonably to have foreseen

that Mr Williams would be exposed to an unacceptable risk of asbestos related

[134] It is not necessarily impossible to reconcile that passage of reasoning with that of

Hale LJ in Jeromson. It may be possible to read it as identifying something that Hale LJ

found was wanting in Jeromson, namely reassurance in the literature that a particular level of

exposure was safe. I do not, however, read it in that way, and have some difficulty

[135] An important factor in Jeromson was “the certain knowledge that asbestos dust was

dangerous and the absence of any knowledge, and indeed any means of knowledge, about

what constituted a safe level of exposure”. The circumstance that in 1960 the Ministry of

Labour published a document containing a maximum permitted concentration of 177

PPCC (7/10) was before the court in Jeromson. The levels of exposure, at least at times, in

Jeromson were thought to exceed that figure, but one of the findings in fact was that there

[136] So far as the 1970 document referred to in Williams is concerned, it is perhaps worth

noting at the outset that it is prefaced with a warning that it had been prepared for the

guidance of Factories Inspectors in relation to enforcement action, and a caution that “only

the Courts can give binding decisions in these matters”. They do not purport to be

[137] The status attached to the 1970 document as a measure of what exposure gave rise to

foreseeable risk similarly does not sit easily with the reasoning of the majority in Maguire. I

have in mind the judgment of Judge LJ at paragraphs 56. He accepts that the correct

question is whether, by a particular point in time, the difficulties related to and the threats

posed by asbestos were sufficiently well-known and sufficiently uncertain in their extent

and effect for employers to be under a duty to reduce exposure to the greatest extent

possible. He went on to say that that analysis begged the question, in the context of

secondary exposure, whether it was by a given date, or should have been, apparent to those

whose employees worked with asbestos, that the health of individuals whose contact with it

came second-hand and intermittently, and whose exposure to it lasted for peak periods

only, was under threat. The reasoning of Longmore LJ at paragraphs 89-91 is to similar

effect, and expressly refers to Jeromson: as between employer and employee the employer

will be in breach of duty if he fails to reduce his employee’s exposure to the greatest extent

possible. I note that neither Maguire nor Jeromson was referred to in Williams.

[138] It therefore seems to me that if I were considering the matter as between employer

and employee, I would not be looking at foreseeability of harm or breach of duty by

reference to any particular level of asbestos in the environment. Rather, I would be

considering whether the employer had reduced exposure to asbestos to the greatest extent

possible and considering the consequences of any failure to do so.

[139] An employer in November 1965 would not have known what level of exposure to

Mr Sweeney would give rise to risk of injury to the deceased, or what level of asbestos on

clothing would be so low as to avoid that risk. The situation was exactly that described by

Hale LJ in the passages quoted above. Whatever the position may have been before 1965, it

must have been apparent in the light of the work by Newhouse and Thompson that there

was an absence of knowledge about what constituted safe exposure. In the words of

Judge LJ, it began to be appreciated that there could be no safe or permissible level of

exposure direct or indirect, to asbestos dust. Although Judge LJ used the word “began”, I

have concluded, for the reasons already given, that the realisation should have been swift,

and the subject of swift action, for an employer such as the defenders.

[140] In addressing Mr Mackenzie’s submission, therefore, I have come to the conclusion

that I do require to approach the matter in the way desiderated in Williams. I do not require

to look at the exposure either of Mr Sweeney or the deceased relative to figures published in

either the 1960 document or the 1970 document. I was not shown anything that indicated

that there was any particular level of occupational exposure to the employee that ought to

have alerted an employer in the position of the defenders to the risk of a person such as the

deceased. Counsel for the defenders asked Mr Howie about both documents, although he

did not explicitly suggest in submission that the levels mentioned in that document should

be taken as indicating the level of exposure for an employee that ought to have triggered

action to avoid risk of injury to someone living with the employee.

[141] Assessing the actual level of exposure to an employee in a historical case of this

nature is fraught with uncertainty. So is the exercise of trying to assess the level of exposure

of someone in the position of the deceased. Against that background, I accept that it is

relevant to ask whether the work Mr Sweeney he engaged in, or the work of those close to

whom he worked, generated significant quantities of dust containing asbestos fibres. That,

however, begs other questions, as to what is meant by “close to” in the particular work

environment. Working in the same department may mean working in a vast industrial hall

at a distance of anything from just a few metres to many, many metres. On the other hand,

workers with different job titles may be employed together in very confined spaces, making

it easier to assess retrospectively their exposure, or at least to be satisfied that they were

[142] Before a duty to take precautions can arise there must be knowledge on the part of

the employer that the employee is being exposed to an extent such as to create a risk that he

will take asbestos home with him. I note that the finding made in Maguire at first instance

was that the defendants must have known that Mr Maguire would transport home each day

from work varying quantities of asbestos to some of which his wife would be exposed and

that they must have known that the descriptions in Mr and Mrs Maguire’s statements would

have been typical among similar employees during the relevant period.

[143] Both counsel in their submissions used the word “significant” in relation to the

finding that I would have to make as to the extent of Mr Sweeney’s exposure to asbestos or

the quantity of asbestos taken home as a prerequisite to a finding of liability. Neither

defined what he meant by significant, other than insofar as Mr Mackenzie referred to

Williams. As I have already indicated, the context is one in which there was no established,

safe level of asbestos exposure, and there was knowledge that secondary exposure to people

who lived with asbestos workers carried with it a risk of fatal injury.

[144] Seeking to draw together in order to establish negligence in this case, the pursuers

(a) Mr Sweeney was exposed to asbestos to an extent such that the defenders must

have known he would take dust containing asbestos fibres home on his clothes.

(b) The defenders failed to reduce the risk to the deceased to the greatest extent

[145] Little was said in submission about causation. The pursuers would require to prove

that the deceased’s exposure to asbestos from Mr Sweeney’s work clothes materially

increased the risk of her developing mesothelioma. Material in this context means more

[146] I regarded Mr McCluskey as generally a credible and reliable witness in giving his

[147] I am to some extent cautious about the evidence of Mr Brennan, and find it hard to

dismiss from my mind that in one of his first answers in examination in chief he indicated

that his knowledge of the use of asbestos in boilermaking at the defenders’ Porterfield Road

premises derived from his internet researches, rather than his own knowledge. I was

uncertain in part as to what he remembered, and what he considered that he knew because

he had seen information about it on the internet, particularly regarding the use of preformed

asbestos. I accept his evidence about the scale of the premises. He gave it under reference to

what bore to be plans of the site. I was more impressed by the detail that he gave in relation

to the way that asbestos cloth and asbestos rope were used and manipulated, and I formed

the impression that he was describing something that he had seen and done at first hand.

His description of the use of asbestos rope was consistent with what Mr Watson told

Mr McCluskey. His description of the use of monkey dung was also broadly consistent with

what Mr Watson is recorded as having said. Where his account coincides with that given by

[148] I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the work of an engineer fitter in the

period from 1964 to 1971 included the application of asbestos rope, asbestos cloth and

asbestos gaskets to boilers. I accept that Mr Sweeney carried out that work. I accept that on

the basis of the account given by Mr Watson to Mr McCluskey. I begin with 1964 because

that is the start of the period which I accept Mr Watson was describing to Mr McCluskey. I

do not know exactly when Mr Watson’s employment ended. It was not explicit in

Mr McCluskey’s account of what Mr Watson said, and was not noted in Mr McCluskey’s

note of their conversation. Mr Watson was, however, still working with the defenders at

the time when they came to supply clean overalls, a change that the deceased’s statement

places later than 1971. I note also that Mr Brennan’s work with the defenders ended

in 1968. I consider it more likely than not that the use of asbestos did not cease suddenly

coincidentally with the end of Mr Brennan’s apprenticeship, and that it continued for some

time thereafter, and have taken that into account in support of Mr Watson’s account.

[149] Mr Mackenzie suggested that it was not clear that Mr Watson was describing a

period after 1965, and that he may have been describing the period of his apprenticeship in

the 1950s. I reject that contention. It seems to me very unlikely, given that the claim being

investigated was that of the deceased, who married Mr Sweeney in 1961, that the focus of

discussion would have been a period in the 1950s. As I have already mentioned, he gave an

account of the provision of clean overalls, an event which the deceased placed after 1971. It

appears to me more generally that he was describing his work and that of Mr Sweeney as

time-served employees when he spoke about where Mr Sweeney worked, and about the

[150] I accept that asbestos paste or monkey dung was used to some extent in lagging the

boilers while they were still in the Porterfield Road premises. I am not able on the evidence

to make a finding as to exactly how it was used in lagging the boilers; for example as to

whether the whole surface was covered or whether it was used to fill particular areas. I

accept that the process of mixing asbestos paste created substantial quantities of dust and

[151] I accept that Mr Sweeney brought dusty clothes home with him. Whether the

deceased had any basis in her own knowledge or from discussion with Mr Sweeney for her

statement that the clothing had asbestos dust on it, I do not know.

[152] I accept that the deceased shook out and washed Mr Sweeney’s work clothes in the

manner described in her statement. Her statement is imprecise as to the frequency with

which she did so, but I infer from what she said that this was a regular occurrence, carried

out throughout the different seasons, and, on the balance of probabilities, at least weekly. I

infer that the defenders knew or ought to have known that work clothes would be cleaned at

[153] I do not know when the practice of supplying overalls once a week began. The

deceased’s statement indicates that it was not until after a house move in about 1973.

Mr Watson said that overalls were provided once a week “later on”.

[154] I do not know where Mr Sweeney worked relative to the laggers. I do not know how

often he worked close to employees who were producing asbestos paste. I do not know how

regularly he handled material such as rope or cloth that contained asbestos fibres.

[155] As mentioned, Mr McCluskey was asked, without objection, whether it had been

clear from what he learned from Mr Watson that asbestos was being broken up and cut. I

observe, first, that that is a leading question, and that the answer given to a leading question

may attract rather less weight than evidence given in response to an open question. The

answer he gave was that Mr Watson spoke about dust being released from those processes.

That is not a direct answer to the question. That Mr Watson spoke to Mr McCluskey about

the cutting and breaking up of asbestos is not obviously supported by the content of

Mr McCluskey’s notes. I am not satisfied that Mr Watson described asbestos being broken

up and cut when he spoke to Mr McCluskey. I am satisfied on the basis of Mr McCluskey’s

notes that Mr Watson described dust being generated from the operations involving rope

asbestos. I am satisfied that those operations generated dust, which floated in the air.

[156] I do not find it hard to credit, in general terms, that asbestos was used in the making

of boilers in the 1960s. The situation is rather different from that confronting Lord Pentland

in Prescott, where there is a sense of a pursuer searching for an explanation as to how he

might have been exposed to asbestos against a background of employment not obviously

involving potential exposure. I do not regard the table in 6/48, which dates from 1967,

describing the use of asbestos in boiler making as “occasional” as casting light on the

question as to Mr Sweeney’s exposure, or the use of asbestos at the defenders’ Porterfield

Road premises. The 1967 document derives from the realisation that workers outwith the

asbestos industry were at risk. Some estimate of those outside that industry who themselves

were exposed by using or manipulating asbestos was attempted, and there was a

recognition that much larger numbers of employees might be at risk. What it shows, in my

view, is that central government, and those experts then advising central government, knew

that there was a significant population at risk and potentially at risk, and did not have

sufficient information fully to assess the scale of the problem. Against that background, a

description of use in a particular industry as “occasional” does not carry any real evidential

weight when trying to assess what happened in a given workplace, during a given period.

[157] The more general evidence from Mr Howie about his knowledge of the use of

asbestos in boilermaking is not irrelevant. Evidence is relevant when it either bears directly

on a fact in issue or does so indirectly because it relates to a fact which makes a fact in issue

more or less probable: CJM (No 2) v HM Advocate 2013 SLT 380 at paragraph 28, and

authorities cited there. While his general evidence about boilermaking may not make it

much more likely that asbestos was used in a particular operation in particular premises, it

is relevant in that it is evidence that supports the likelihood that asbestos was used in the

[158] No positive evidence was adduced to contradict the evidence led for the pursuers

about the use of asbestos by and in the presence of fitters in the Porterfield Road works.

[159] I accept that it is more likely than not that the deceased developed mesothelioma as a

result of being exposed to asbestos. Mr Howie’s evidence that idiopathic development of

asbestos was extremely rare was not challenged, and I accept it. It is very much more likely

that she developed mesothelioma because she was exposed to asbestos. That might be in the

environment generally, or it might be by some other means. That she developed

mesothelioma does not lead to an inference that she was exposed to any particular degree;

her exposure may have been slight, as Dr Semple said. I am satisfied that the source of the

asbestos was more likely than not to have been asbestos on Mr Sweeney’s clothes, as I am

satisfied that he was exposed to asbestos in the course of his work and that he brought home

dusty clothes. I am not satisfied that there is evidence of any competing, or even additional,

potential source of exposure so far as the deceased is concerned. I am satisfied that he did

work with asbestos, that dust was produced by that work, and that dust containing some

asbestos fibres will have ended up on his clothes. Again, because mesothelioma may result

from slight exposure, it does not follow from the fact that the deceased developed

mesothelioma that Mr Sweeney brought home any particular quantity on his clothes or with

[160] I have no evidence about the level of asbestos fibres in the dust generated by the

operations involving rope or cloth. Mr Howie did not give evidence about that. I disregard

Mr Howie’s evidence about the dust produced by cutting or handling preformed sections of

asbestos. Having excluded as inadmissible the evidence from Mr Brennan on this matter,

there is no factual basis for the proposition that Mr Sweeney was exposed to dust generated

[161] Mr Howie’s evidence, including the photograph reproduced in his letter, supports

the proposition that this activity gave off considerable, or substantial, quantities of dust,

although it appears to be a photograph of an insulator or lagger, rather than someone

working in the same environment as an insulator or lagger. Mr Howie’s figures for

estimated exposure to Mr Sweeney from this activity were the subject of criticism. Any

figure is going involve speculation, of a more or less informed nature. I accept that the

figures Mr Howie took from the literature are a reasonable starting point. They may well be

the best evidence available. They indicate that some processes generated more fibres of

asbestos per ml of air than others did. The processes associated with creating monkey dung

produced very considerable quantities of dust, and concentrations of asbestos fibres that

[162] If there had been evidence that Mr Sweeney worked within a particular distance of

the laggers, that might have provided a basis for an opinion from Mr Howie as to the extent

of exposure. If I had heard evidence about working right next to laggers, or a few metres

away, or working alongside them in a relatively constricted space, I might have been

prepared to draw an inference even absent an opinion of that sort. In the absence of

information about that person’s distance from the laggers, in the context of working

environments of quite a vast scale, as described by Mr Brennan, the figures in the literature

provide limited information about Mr Sweeney’s actual exposure.

[163] What is clear, however, is that Mr Sweeney worked in the Porterfield Road works for

a long time, and that he did so in the capacity of a fitter. Although it would certainly have

been desirable and helpful to have more detailed information from Mr Watson, he described

a very dusty atmosphere resulting from the use of asbestos. He saw Mr Sweeney directly

involved in the use of materials containing asbestos. He described asbestos being

“everywhere” in the context of laggers being on site. He was being asked about these

matters in the context of an inquiry being made of him about the conditions in which

Mr Sweeney worked. It is notable that the work was such that, at some stage, the defenders

provided “industrial masks”. That connotes understanding on their part either that there

was dust which was itself injurious, or that there was dust in a quantity such as to give rise

to a need for protection. The assembly of boilers was, according to Mr Watson’s account, the

main point where asbestos came into play. He said that Mr Sweeney worked in “assembly

and tube”. The deceased said that Mr Sweeney worked “in the construction of boilers”. I

have no reason to doubt any of that information. The description of him working in the

construction of boilers is consistent with a description of him working in “assembly”.

[164] Given the duration of Mr Sweeney’s employment as a fitter, and the description

given by Mr Watson to Mr McCluskey , which I accept, I am satisfied that he would over a

substantial number of years have been exposed to varying quantities of asbestos dust, and

that he took dust containing asbestos fibres home with him on his clothes. I am satisfied

from the description of the work given by Mr Watson that this exposure would have been

known to the defenders, and that the quantities of dust produced by the operations,

particularly those involving the production and use of asbestos paste, should have alerted

[165] So far as evidence relating to the deceased’s exposure is concerned, any estimate, to

borrow an expression used by Judge LJ in a similar context in Maguire, is at best informed

speculation. Mr Mackenzie criticised Mr Howie for his reliance on the figures referred to in

Maguire at paragraphs 14 and 15. He had taken a figure agreed by the experts in that case.

What the experts had done in that case was to refer to an experiment, involving two sets of

contaminated overalls worn by two employees of a company with a factory in Rochdale,

reported in an internal memorandum dated 7th April 1970. The memorandum itself was

included in the papers available to the Court of Appeal, and presumably also to Morland J.

“On the face of it, this was indeed an experiment rather than research. The short

note of the result begins: ‘Purely as a matter of interest I did some dust tests on two

sets of overalls …’ The clothes were worn by two individuals who were examining

the inside of a dust extraction plant. Inevitably therefore the clothes were very

dusty. They were shaken for about 15 to 20 seconds. The joint experts think it likely

that the overalls were indeed deliberately shaken for the purpose of testing, and that

they were shaken shortly after being removed by the original wearers. The results of

these tests translated into the facts of the present case produced this agreed

‘If the dust on the [Mr Maguire]’s clothing had contained between 15-50% of

asbestos fibres depending on what asbestos-based materials he had encountered

and/or had been using … we are agreed that all other factors being equal, a

person who shook overalls, which were contaminated with dust containing

between 15-50% asbestos fibres, could have been exposed to an average asbestos

fibre concentration in the range 30-100 fibres/ml [millilitres].’”

[166] I do not regard the presence or absence of evidence about the actual level of exposure

of the deceased as of particular significance in considering negligence. As I have said, it will

be impossible to produce more than informed speculation as to the level, and I do not regard

a finding as crucial to establishing liability. In relation to the evidence in this case, however,

I make the following observation. It is not necessarily hard to produce a figure for the

length of time that a person would take to shake out clothing, whether by experiment or

reasonable estimate based on common experience. It may be reasonable to apply an

estimate of that sort to data from another source about the exposure produced from the

exercise of shaking out dusty clothing. What concerns me in this case is the source of the

data. If a party is seeking to establish exposure at a particular level, it is not good enough to

present to a court a figure taken from the court report of another litigation as representing

what was agreed evidence in that case. It is perfectly legitimate for an expert witness to use

figures derived from the literature associated with a particular discipline or endeavour.

When the literature is produced it can be scrutinised. The literature, brief though it seems to

have been, was actually produced in Maguire. The context in which particular experimental

results have been achieved, or observations recorded, can be considered when literature is

produced. The methodology can be looked at. These factors may cast light on the reliability

of the data recorded in the literature, and may make it apparent that they are, or are not,

data relevant to the subject on which the expert is providing an opinion. That sort of

scrutiny cannot be applied where a witness has simply used a figure agreed in another

[167] In relation to causation, an estimate of exposure is of some use, in that, in relation to

causation, the court requires to consider whether the exposure materially increased the risk

of developing mesothelioma. If the increase in risk were even a small fraction of that

described by Mr Howie (who gave a figure of at least forty-fold in each year), I would

regard it as material. If the deceased shook out and washed clothes visibly contaminated

with dust, at least once of week, over a period of years, and that dust contained asbestos

fibres, then it seems to me that, on the balance of probabilities, her risk of developing

[168] I am satisfied that the defenders failed to reduce the risk to the deceased. There was

no safe, known level of exposure. Against that background, what an employer required to

do, so far as an employee was concerned, was to reduce the risk to the lowest level

practicable. Once it was appreciated, as it was from late 1965, that there was a risk to

persons in the position of the deceased, the duty was, again, to reduce the risk to the lowest

level practicable. I am satisfied on the evidence that no precautions were taken so far as

Mr Sweeney was concerned, and that no precautions were taken to protect the deceased

until after 1971. In determining the standard of care required of somebody on whom the

duty of care is imposed, a court has to have regard to the probability of harm caused as a

result of the breach of duty and also the probable seriousness of the harm: Rice, Silber J, at

paragraph 81. There was, as Mr Howie said, a simple precaution that could easily have been

employed so far as the risk to people living with employees was concerned. It is a

precaution they eventually took. As with risks to employees, that risk, and the appropriate

precaution, must be viewed against a background where there was no known safe level of

exposure. That precaution would have been to have work clothes left at work, and cleaned

there, as happened at some later stage. I do not require in this case to make a very fine

judgment as to precisely when the defenders should have introduced the precaution. As I

have said, the defenders were a major industrial concern. They were aware of the risk in

late 1965. They should have acted promptly, within a period of months of October 1965.

[169] I make the following comment on the passages quoted at the beginning of this

Opinion. I have no real difficulty with the proposition that the court should do its best with

the material before it, or with the pragmatic approach adopted by the first instance judge in

Harris and approved by the Court of Appeal. I do query the notion that in deciding a case in

one way rather than the other a court would ever be “sheltering” behind the burden of

proof. A court will always have to assess whether there is enough material in the evidence

to justify the conclusion urged by a party, applying, in civil cases, the test whether

something has been proved on the balance of probabilities. It is realistic to approach

evidence about events in the distant past on the basis that it will probably contain less detail

[170] In Sienkiewicz, in the passage quoted, Lord Rodger was referring to the findings of

the judge at first instance in one of the cases actually before the Supreme Court - Knowsley

Metropolitan Borough Council v Willmore. Lady Hale described the findings as “truly heroic”

(paragraph 173). Lord Mance said they were “slender and speculative”, although the

Supreme Court did not overturn the findings in question. The Fairchild exception is the rule

that any exposure which has increased materially the risk of developing mesothelioma will

be treated as having caused mesothelioma. The pursuer does not have to prove on the

balance of probabilities that particular exposure caused the condition. The rule is of

particular relevance where a person has been exposed to asbestos by more than one

potential defender, and also where exposure may have been both in the environment

generally and at the hands of a particular defender. The state of medical knowledge does

not permit the identification of the exposure which caused the mesothelioma. I note that in

Willmore the claimant had herself identified a source of exposure other than the defendant

(see: Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2009] EWHC 1831 (QB), at

paragraph 5. Lord Rodger’s point is that the usual rules about causation have been relaxed

broadly to the advantage of the pursuer and the disadvantage of the defender, to permit

recovery of damages where the scientific knowledge as to causation of the condition is

lacking in particular respects. Where there has been relaxation of one requirement usually

imposed on pursuers, relaxation of others would disturb the balance struck by the law. I

accept that courts should not exercise themselves to make “heroic” findings. If difficulties of

proof in historic cases make it difficult to achieve justice, that may simply be an indication of

limitations inherent in a system which requires proof of fault before compensation is

[171] For the reasons set out above I am satisfied that the defenders negligently exposed

the deceased to asbestos, and materially increased the risk that she would develop

mesothelioma. I accordingly award damages in the sums set out the joint minute.

Scottish Court of Session Decisions